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The Loudest Voice at the Supreme 
Court: The Solicitor General’s 
Dominance of Amicus Oral Argument 
Darcy Covert* 
Annie J. Wang** 
The Solicitor General (“SG”) is often called the “Tenth Justice,” a title 
that captures his unique relationship with the Supreme Court and his 
independence from the executive branch. No phenomenon better reflects this 
relationship than the Court’s practice of permitting amici to participate in oral 
argument. Although amicus oral argument is nominally available to all 
litigants, the modern Court grants this privilege almost exclusively to the SG. 
Scholars and Court watchers have long argued that this practice is justified 
because the SG uses it to pursue the rule of law and an objective sense  
of “justice.” 
This Article challenges that account. The SG’s dominance of amicus 
oral argument is a relatively recent phenomenon. In the early 1900s, the SG 
requested amicus oral argument almost exclusively to defend federal statutes or 
federal agency action. During this time, the Court granted all his amicus oral 
argument requests. But, over time, SGs increasingly entered political cases with 
only tenuous connections to the federal government. During the late 1980s, the 
Court became skeptical of the SG’s political independence; in response, it denied 
seventeen percent of his amicus oral argument motions, and individual Justices 
criticized him in internal memoranda. Thirty years later, the Court permits the 
SG to argue as an amicus in almost any case he wants, even though he 
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increasingly weighs in on politically charged cases with de minimis 
implications for the federal government. 
This new equilibrium has profound consequences. By permitting the SG 
to be heard any time he asks, the Court systematically biases the perspectives 
that it hears. This bias undermines due process principles and the adversarial 
system, and it ignores the Court’s own history and rules. We offer a proposal  
for reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In April 2020, the United States Supreme Court did something 
it had not done in nearly a decade: it denied a motion by the Office of 
the Solicitor General of the United States (“OSG”) to participate in oral 
argument as amicus.1 While many litigants file amicus briefs at the 
Court, amicus oral argument is a rare occurrence for every litigant 
except the OSG. Between the 2010 and 2019 Terms, the Court granted 
only fifteen of forty-three motions for amicus oral argument by litigants 
other than the OSG.2 During that time, it granted 306 amicus oral 
argument motions—all but one—by the OSG. April’s denial, which was 
for an argument set in the 2020 Term, was the first since 2011. 
To most Supreme Court litigators and other Court watchers, the 
Solicitor General’s (“SG”) dominance of amicus oral argument is taken 
as a matter of course.3 The SG directs all appellate litigation involving 
the federal government and represents it before the Supreme Court.4 
The SG’s relationship with the Court is so unique that he5 is often called 
the “Tenth Justice.”6 This title captures the SG’s long-standing, self-
 
 1. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 140 S. Ct. 2665 (mem.) (2020). 
 2.  Throughout this Article, we define a “motion” as a request to argue in a “case,” where 
cases are organized by citation rather than by docket number. In many instances, cases ultimately 
consolidated into a single opinion were also consolidated for oral argument. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (consolidating cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and 
Delaware). As a result, counting each motion by docket number would artificially inflate the 
frequency of amicus oral argument. By the same token, if a party requests oral argument in 
multiple cases in a single motion, we consider that multiple motions (where the number of motions 
is equal to the number of resulting opinions). 
 3. See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s 
Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1331 (2010) (suggesting that 
Supreme Court procedure encourages SG participation as amicus curiae); Patricia A. Millett, We’re 
Your Government and We’re Here to Help: Obtaining Amicus Support from the Federal Government 
in Supreme Court Cases, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 209, 227 & n.33 (2009) (discussing the role 
the OSG can play in advocacy). 
 4. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1326. 
 5. With the exception of Elena Kagan, every SG has been male. See OFF. OF THE SOLIC. GEN., 
About the Office, DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/osg/historical-bios (last visited Feb. 4, 
2021) [https://perma.cc/4F5S-GHFC]. Therefore, we use the pronoun “he” to refer to the SG. 
 6. See generally LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE 
RULE OF LAW (1987). 
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proclaimed commitment to “justice”—“a voice that speaks on behalf of 
the rule of law”7—rather than to victory in any given case. 
This Article challenges this conventional account. Far from 
being static, the SG’s relationship to the Court has evolved dramatically 
over the last century. No practice better reflects this dynamic than 
amicus oral argument, which provides a rare signal of which litigants 
the otherwise-opaque Court favors. Over the last twenty years, the OSG 
has argued in 69%–88% of the Court’s cases; over half of those 
arguments were as an amicus. Our comprehensive historical analysis 
of every motion for amicus oral argument demonstrates that the SG’s 
current rate of arguing as an amicus is a relatively modern 
phenomenon. As recently as the late 1980s, the Court refused 17% of 
the SG’s requests—reaching a high of 28% in the 1987 Term—and 
criticized him in private memoranda. 
This often-ignored period challenges, as both a descriptive and 
normative matter, the conventional view that the SG’s outsized 
presence at amicus oral argument is benign. Descriptively, our analysis 
shows that the Court could—and once did—respond more critically to 
the SG’s attempts to use his influence to advance the president’s 
political objectives rather than the long-term interests of the federal 
government. Normatively, this period highlights the vast procedural 
and substantive consequences of permitting the SG to regularly argue 
as amicus. 
Indeed, while discussing the OSG’s participation as an amicus 
and as a party in roughly 80% of the Court’s cases, then-Judge (and 
former Principal Deputy Solicitor General) John G. Roberts remarked: 
If you asked me as an abstract proposition whether I would be troubled by the idea that 
the executive branch was going to file something in every case before the Supreme Court 
explaining its views, as a sort of super law clerk, my answer would be yes, I would find 
that very troubling. Eighty percent is pretty close to every case . . . .8 
Today, Chief Justice Roberts is one of four current Justices who 
previously worked at the OSG.9 
Amicus oral argument distorts the adversarial process by taking 
argument time from one of the parties and allocating it elsewhere. In 
addition, amici are encouraged to offer legal arguments not advanced 
 
 7. Seth P. Waxman, “Presenting the Case of the United States As It Should Be”: The Solicitor 
General in Historical Context, J. SUP. CT. HIST., no. 2, 1998, at 3, 4. 
 8. John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-Emergence of a Supreme Court Bar, 30 J. 
SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 79 (2005). 
 9. Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/ 
biographies.aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/2CHR-FRH6]. The four Justices are 
Elena Kagan (SG, 2009–10), John G. Roberts, Jr. (Principal Deputy SG, 1989–93), Samuel A. Alito, 
Jr. (Assistant to the SG, 1981–85), and Brett M. Kavanaugh (Bristow Fellow, 1992–93). 
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by the parties, which may undermine or derail a party’s arguments. 
Amici who argue at the Court also have an opportunity to influence the 
substantive development of the law. The SG’s choice to participate more 
frequently as an amicus than as a party evidences that he recognizes 
this fact. 
Scrutinizing the SG’s special place at the Court seems 
particularly apt at this moment in history. Recently departed SG Noel 
Francisco is widely perceived as having tested the outer limits of the 
Tenth Justice reputation—through requests for extraordinary relief,10 
appeals to overturn precedent,11 and switches in position in individual 
cases.12 The last time Court watchers were this concerned about the 
OSG’s commitment to the rule of law was during SG Charles Fried’s 
tenure, addressed in Lincoln Caplan’s seminal account of the office, The 
Tenth Justice.13 One difference between the two periods, however, is 
that while the Court rebuked Fried’s bolder stances, it generally 
embraced Francisco’s.14 
Despite a substantial literature discussing the SG generally, no 
scholarship has examined the OSG’s outsized presence at amicus oral 
argument. Yet amicus oral argument is one of the rare signals the Court 
sends about whose opinions it values. Because the Justices must 
affirmatively allocate a scare resource—argument time—amicus oral 
argument is a uniquely important lens through which to analyze the 
Court’s behavior. 
Our account of the OSG’s participation in amicus oral argument 
makes three novel contributions to the existing literature on the SG’s 
influence at the Court. First, it offers the first quantitative and 
qualitative history of the practice of amicus oral argument before the 
Court. Using 131 volumes of the annual Journal of the Supreme Court 
 
 10. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. 
REV. 123, 124 (2019). 
 11. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Trump Administration Asks Supreme Court to Overrule 
Precedent Helping Unions, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
courts_law/trump-administration-asks-supreme-court-to-overrule-precedent-helping-unions/ 
2017/12/06/64794b1a-dabc-11e7-b1a8 62589434a581_story.html [https://perma.cc/678E-VRTJ].  
 12. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Trump’s Legal U-Turns May Test Supreme Court’s Patience,  
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/us/politics/trump-supreme-
court.html [https://perma.cc/ZV5T-RDWH] (describing how the Trump Administration abandoned 
positions previously held by the Obama Administration). 
 13. CAPLAN, supra note 6. 
 14. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 10, at 126 (noting that the Court granted “most” of SG 
Francisco’s requests for emergency and extraordinary relief and that even the Court’s denials have 
come with “no suggestion” that the SG “is abusing his unique position, taking advantage of his 
special relationship with the Court, or otherwise acting in a manner unbecoming the office  
he holds”). 
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of the United States, we constructed a dataset of every motion for 
amicus oral argument filed from the 1889 through 2019 Terms, 
including the litigant who filed the motion and the Court’s ruling on it. 
Using these data, we chart more than a century—and likely close to the 
entirety15—of this practice. 
Our qualitative account of this practice identifies the types of 
cases in which amici request oral argument from the Court and how 
they have changed over time. We develop this analysis using original 
archival research on the Justices’ papers and interviews with frequent 
Supreme Court litigators, including current and former members of the 
OSG. This research underlies our account of when the Court grants 
amicus oral argument and why, when doing so, the Court has so often 
heard from the OSG. 
Second, this Article synthesizes and rebuts the most common 
justifications for the OSG’s outsized participation in this practice and 
the SG’s reputation as the Tenth Justice more broadly. We argue, for 
the first time, that the SG’s ability to perform the Tenth Justice role 
stems from a procedural abnormality: his lack of a readily identifiable 
client. This allows the OSG to ignore the ethical and professional rules 
that bind every other lawyer. The type of “independence” the OSG is 
thought to have is possible only because it does not have a client whose 
interests it must serve and defend. 
Finally, we offer the first normative account of when the Court 
should grant amicus oral argument to any litigant. We center this 
account in the Court’s dual objectives of upholding due process for 
individual litigants while also “resolv[ing] public policy issues of 
national importance.”16 We suggest that the Court should grant 
argument to only two categories of amici: those who have a concrete 
interest in the litigation and have put forth new legal reasoning that is 
useful to the Court’s decisionmaking process; and those who, regardless 
of interest, have raised a completely new legal issue the Court should 
address to decide the case. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief 
overview of the relevant concepts and justifies the use of amicus oral 
argument as a lens through which to examine the OSG and its 
 
 15. See infra Section II.B.1 (describing the rarity of amicus oral argument through the 1930s). 
 16. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal 
Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1273 n.29 (2001) 
(quoting Peter G. Fish, Judiciary Act of 1925, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 476, 477 (Kermit L. Hall, Joel B. Grossman & William M. Wiecek  
eds., 1992)). 
             
2021] THE LOUDEST VOICE AT THE SUPREME COURT 687 
 
relationship with the Court.17 Substantively, oral argument is a 
significant component of Supreme Court practice. It is also the only 
time an amicus is guaranteed to be heard by the Justices.18 Oral 
argument may inform and persuade in ways that a written brief does 
not, and many social scientists have demonstrated how oral argument 
may inform the Justices’ thinking.19 Because total argument time is 
limited, the Court’s decision to permit an amicus to argue also helps 
elucidate which litigants it values. 
Part II employs a mixed-methods approach to construct an 
original quantitative and qualitative history of the practice of amicus 
oral argument. Using our novel dataset of Supreme Court amicus oral 
argument motions practice, we show how the past sixty years have seen 
a dramatic rise in the number of requests for amicus oral argument. 
Most of this increase is attributable to the OSG. We also draw on 
Supreme Court history from the late nineteenth century to today to 
chart the evolution of amicus oral argument before the Court. By 
documenting the cases in which amici have asked for and received 
permission to participate at oral argument, we trace how this practice 
has changed throughout history. 
Part III examines three possible justifications for the OSG’s 
outsized access to amicus oral argument and evaluates them in the 
modern context. Drawing on interviews with top Supreme Court 
litigators and other original historical research, we identify three key 
advantages that the OSG is thought to possess over other litigants: a 
staff of skilled lawyers who are experts in Supreme Court litigation, an 
ability to collect and communicate information from federal agencies, 
and the Tenth Justice reputation. 
These explanations, however, do not justify the Court’s current 
amicus oral argument practice. The development of the modern 
Supreme Court bar has dramatically improved the quality of oral 
argument in many cases and reduced the OSG’s historical advantage in 
this area. Additionally, the OSG does not frequently present otherwise 
unavailable information about agency operations in its amicus briefs 
and arguments, and when it has done so, the information has not 
always been reliable. Finally, the OSG’s amicus positions do not 
necessarily reflect the traditional Tenth Justice values. Absent 
 
 17. Although there are many facets of the OSG’s influence at the Court, including its 
exemption from the requirement of obtaining either party permission or leave of court to file an 
amicus brief, see SUP. CT. R. 37.4, this Article considers only amicus oral argument.  
 18. James L. Cooper, The Solicitor General and the Evolution of Activism, 65 IND. L.J. 675, 
693 (1990). 
 19. Infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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legitimate reasons to give preference to the OSG over other possible 
amici at oral argument, the Court should apply the same criteria for 
granting OSG and non-OSG amicus oral argument motions. 
Part IV proposes criteria the Court should apply when deciding 
whether to grant an amicus oral argument motion. We argue that our 
framework would promote due process, sound substantive outcomes, 
pragmatism, and legitimacy better than the Court’s current practice. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE AMICUS ROLE,  
ORAL ARGUMENT, AND THE OSG 
The amicus curiae role at the Supreme Court, and especially 
amicus participation at oral argument, has changed markedly over the 
last century and a half. To contextualize those changes, we provide an 
overview of the amicus role, oral argument, and the OSG as an 
institution. We also explain why amicus oral argument is a useful lens 
for examining the OSG’s influence at the Court. 
A. The Amicus Role 
The term “amicus curiae” means “friend of the court.”20 At 
English common law, amici were viewed as inimical to the adversarial 
system, and courts resisted advocacy by amici who had an interest in 
the litigation.21 Thus, amicus participation was limited to nonlitigants 
who helped the court avoid errors by giving impartial advice.22 In the 
American system, the amicus curiae role quickly departed from a 
neutral error checker to something resembling a traditional advocate 
who sought to help one of the parties.23 
The Court implores organizations and individuals to file amicus 
briefs only if they “bring[ ] to the attention of the Court relevant matter 
not already brought to its attention by the parties.”24 When an amicus 
supports a particular party, the amicus can strengthen the party’s 
position by fleshing out its arguments or offering new ones. When an 
amicus writes in support of neither party, it often hopes to help the 
Court by setting out an alternative path. 
 
 20. Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901,  
1902 (2016).  
 21. See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 
694, 696 (1963). 
 22. Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin After the 
Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (1992); Krislov, supra note 21, at 694–95. 
 23. Krislov, supra note 21, at 697; Lowman, supra note 22, at 1244–45. 
 24. SUP. CT. R. 37.1. 
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Most amici may file briefs only with the permission of both 
parties, or with leave from the Court.25 All amicus briefs must explain 
the author’s “interest” in the litigation.26 The Court’s attitude towards 
amici has varied over the years: sometimes it seeks them out, and  
other times it castigates them for presenting repetitive and  
political arguments.27 
Today, parties (including the OSG) typically grant blanket 
consent to amicus briefs.28 Nevertheless, the modern amicus brief is so 
carefully orchestrated by the parties that practitioners have termed it 
the “amicus machine.”29 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,30 for example, 
Petitioners’ attorney Neal Katyal handpicked thirty-seven amici and 
labeled each brief with the proposition it supported.31 
Despite the time and resources that parties put into organizing 
and coordinating amici, the Justices very likely do not read all the 
amicus briefs in a given case. Justices often rely on their clerks to read 
most briefs, while personally examining only a few.32 Empirical 
evidence shows that although citations to amicus briefs are on the rise, 
those citations represent only a small fraction of the briefs submitted in 
a case.33 To guarantee that the Justices will hear its viewpoint, an 
amicus must argue before the Court. 
B. Amicus Oral Argument 
Amicus oral argument is significant both for its substantive 
value and because the decision to grant it reveals the Justices’ 
preferences for certain amici. Despite its importance, no scholar has 
examined amicus oral argument in any depth. 
Serving on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, then-Judge Roberts said that “oral argument is terribly, 
terribly important” because it allows the judges to hear what their 
colleagues think of the case through the questions they ask and 
 
 25. Id. 37.2, 37.4. 
 26. Id. 37.2(b), 37.3(b), 37.5. 
 27. See infra notes 354-356 and accompanying text. 
 28. Larsen & Devins, supra note 20, at 1925. 
 29. Id. at 1906. 
 30. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 31. Larsen & Devins, supra note 20, at 1924–25. 
 32. Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae 
Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 43–46 (2004). 
 33. Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Review: ‘Friends 
of the Court’ Roared Back in 2017–18 Term, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 16, 2018. 
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comments they make.34 Justice Anthony Kennedy, before retiring in 
2018, saw oral argument as a means of communicating with his 
colleagues and believed that it made a difference to case outcomes.35 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,36 Antonin Scalia,37 and William H. 
Rehnquist38 also believed that oral argument could have significant 
impact in some cases.  
Over the years, a few Justices have maintained that oral 
argument is insignificant, but they are in the minority. Justice Clarence 
Thomas famously stated: “I don’t see the need for all those questions. I 
think Justices, 99 percent of the time, have their minds made up when 
they go to the bench.”39 Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., has said that “[o]ral 
argument is a relatively small and, truth be told, a relatively 
unimportant part of what we do.”40 
Empirical research suggests that oral argument does matter, 
subject to some disagreement over when and why. Several political 
scientists have used notes kept by former Justices Harry A. Blackmun 
and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to conclude that, controlling for variables like 
the Justice’s ideology and a case’s complexity, the Justices’ votes in a 
case depend significantly on the quality of the advocate appearing 
before the Court.41 Others have looked to the content of the Justices’ 
 
 34. Roberts, supra note 8, at 69. See generally James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Source 
of Information or “Dog and Pony Show”?: Judicial Information Seeking During U.S. Supreme 
Court Oral Argument, 1963-1965 & 2004-2009, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 88–92 (2010). 
 35. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 248 (7th 
ed. 2005). 
 36. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 567, 570 (1999) 
(describing oral argument as a “hold-the-line operation” and noting that a bad oral argument can 
swing a potential winner to a loser but rarely the reverse). 
 37. Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Oral Advocacy Before the 
United States Supreme Court: Does It Affect the Justices’ Decisions?, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 457, 458 
(2007) (“Things . . . can be put in perspective during oral argument in a way that they can’t in a 
written brief.” (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia)). 
 38. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 243–44 (Knopf Doubleday Publ’g Grp. 
2007) (noting that oral argument made a difference to his decision in a “significant minority” of 
cases, especially when the case presented unfamiliar legal issues). 
 39. Phillips & Carter, supra note 34, at 92 (quoting Terry Rombeck, Justice Takes Time for 
Q & A, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD (Oct. 30, 2002), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2002/oct/30/ 
justice_takes_time [https://perma.cc/UHX5-74EG].  
 40. Terry M. Richman, Alito: Prep More Important than Oral Arguments, N.Y. DAILY  
REC. (May 17, 2011), https://nydailyrecord.com/2011/05/17/alito-prep-more-important-than-oral-
arguments [https://perma.cc/VXR5-9DFJ]. 
 41. See, e.g., Eve M. Ringsmuth, Amanda C. Bryan & Timothy R. Johnson, Voting Fluidity 
and Oral Argument on the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 POL. RSCH. Q. 429, 434–35 (2013) (“As . . . the 
opposed attorney becomes more skilled, Blackmun and Powell’s probability of switching positions 
increases nearly 30 percent from the lowest vale of quality differential to the highest.”); Timothy 
R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs, II, The Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 111–12 (2006) (using quantitative measures to 
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questions at oral argument to determine what role the practice might 
play for the Justices themselves. Using conference notes from several 
of the Justices, political scientist Timothy R. Johnson found that 
information discussed only at oral arguments constituted nearly half of 
the issues discussed at conference and over a quarter of the issues in 
case syllabi.42 
In addition to the substantive value of oral argument, the 
Court’s decision to grant amicus oral argument is a meaningful signal 
from an otherwise-opaque institution. When the Court grants certiorari 
in a case, each side automatically receives thirty minutes of argument 
time.43 If there are multiple parties on one side, the parties may seek 
permission to divide the argument in a motion that “set[s] out 
specifically and concisely why more than one attorney should be  
allowed to argue.”44 But the Court stresses that “[d]ivided argument is 
not favored.”45 
Oral argument time is a limited resource at the Court, and the 
Justices must affirmatively allocate such time to amici. Although the 
Court does not make public how many votes are needed to grant amicus 
oral argument, our archival research suggests it takes five.46 The 
 
demonstrate that “justices are more likely to vote for the litigant whose attorney provided higher 
quality oral advocacy . . . even after controlling for ideological considerations”); Johnson et al., 
supra note 37, at 524 (“[E]vidence clearly indicates that the Justices’ votes in a case depend 
substantially on the relative quality of the lawyers appearing before the Court.”). But see Andrea 
McAtee & Kevin T. McGuire, Lawyers, Justices, and Issue Salience: When and How Do Legal 
Arguments Affect the U.S. Supreme Court?, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 260 (2007) (concluding that 
the quality of oral advocates affects case outcomes primarily “when the justices’ informational 
needs are high and the intensity of their predispositions is low”). 
 42. TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 80, 99 (2011). 
 43. SUP. CT. R. 16.2, 28.3. 
 44. Id. 28.4. 
 45. Id. 
 46. The Supreme Court Rules do not expressly state the number of votes required to grant a 
motion. But based on Justice Blackmun’s papers, which contain many conference memoranda in 
which the motions for amicus oral argument were discussed, we believe five votes are required.  
 When five Justices voted in favor of a motion for amicus oral argument, the motion was 
granted, as was the case in the ACLU’s motion for amicus oral argument in Solorio v. United 
States. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Conference from Chief Justice at 8–9 (Aug. 29, 1986), in 
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter Blackmun Papers], Box 458, Folder 
11 (showing a vote against Motion 12); Memorandum from Justice White (Sept. 9, 1986), id. (voting 
against); Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist (Sept. 3, 1986), id. (voting against); Memorandum 
from Justice Marshall (Sept. 3, 1986), id. (voting against); Memorandum from Justice O’Connor 
(Sept. 8, 1986), id. (voting to grant); Memorandum from Justice Powell (Sept. 4, 1986), id. (voting 
to grant); Memorandum from Justice Stevens (Sept. 3, 1986), id. (voting to grant); Memorandum 
from Harry Blackmun (Sept. 2, 1986), id. (voting to grant); Memorandum from Justice Brennan 
(Sept. 9, 1986), id. (voting to grant). Because these votes were expressed through official 
memoranda, we can be confident in the split of votes. The requirement of five votes was also 
reflected in Blackmun’s handwritten annotations. See Memorandum for the Conference from Chief 
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Court’s decision to permit an amicus to argue is an unusually direct 
signal that the Court is interested in the amicus’s views. Because 
parties generally grant blanket permission for amici to file briefs,47 and 
because the Court almost always grants leave to file a brief even when 
the parties do not give permission,48 the filing of an amicus brief on its 
own is not a measure of influence. On the other hand, looking solely at 
whether an amicus brief is cited is too narrow a measure. Amicus briefs 
may be influential even without being cited.49 The decision to allow an 
amicus to argue, by contrast, reflects the views of five Justices that the 
amicus will use that time in a way that is more useful to the Court than 
would the party the amicus supports.  
The mechanics of amicus oral argument are governed by the 
Supreme Court Rules. Although the practice of amicus oral argument 
began much earlier, it first appeared in the Rules in 1954: 
Counsel for an amicus curiae . . . may, with the consent of a party, argue orally on the side 
of such party . . . . In the absence of such consent, argument by counsel for an amicus 
curiae may be made only by special leave of court, on motion particularly setting forth 
why such argument is thought to provide assistance to the court not otherwise available. 
Such motions, unless made on behalf of the United States or of a State, Territory, 
Commonwealth, or Possession, are not favored.50 
The 1954 Rule distinguished between motions made with and 
without the consent of the party the amicus supports, noting that 
motions in the latter category were “not favored” unless they came from 
a government entity.51 The 1980 Rules eliminated this preference and 
set a higher bar for all parties: without the consent of the party it 
supports, an amicus’s motion for amicus oral argument “will be granted 
 
Justice at 1 (Feb. 9, 1985), id. at Box 409, Folder 9 (including handwritten annotations from 
Blackmun that five Justices voted in favor of the SG’s motion for amicus oral argument in Gould 
v. Ruefenacht); Memorandum for the Conference from Chief Justice at 1 (Sept. 10, 1987), id. at 
Box 485, Folder 12 (same with respect to Boos v. Berry). By contrast, when only four Justices voted 
to grant a motion, the motion was denied. Memorandum for the Conference from Chief Justice at 
2–3 (Dec. 10, 1987), id. (including handwritten annotations from Blackmun that four Justices 
voted in favor of the SG’s motion for amicus oral argument in United States v. Providence Journal 
Co.). In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Chief Justice was recused from the case, and the Justices split 
four to grant and four to deny. The motion was denied. Memorandum from Chief Justice at 2 (May 
27, 1987), id. at Box 458, Folder 12. 
 47. Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 809 (2004). 
 48. Eugene Volokh, Should U.S. Supreme Court Litigants Decline Consent for Filing of 
Amicus Briefs?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 28, 2018), https://reason.com/2018/04/28/should-us-
supreme-court-litigants-declin [https://perma.cc/C97P-DK2G]. 
 49. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on 
the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 844–45 (2000) (describing flaws in using citations as a 
measure of an amicus influence). 
 50. SUP. CT. R. 44.7 (1954) (repealed 1980). 
 51. Id. 
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only in the most extraordinary circumstances.”52 This standard persists 
through the 2019 Rules.53 
C. The Court’s Foremost Amicus: The OSG 
As we discuss in Part II, the OSG is by far the most frequent 
participant in amicus oral argument. The OSG has a role in the federal 
government’s litigation in lower courts,54 but it is best known for 
representing the U.S. government before the Supreme Court. 
The only federal officer required to be “learned in the law,”55 the 
SG has traditionally held a dual allegiance. He is an executive officer 
appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate who reports to 
the Attorney General (“AG”) and works within the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”).56 But he also has a second office, a few blocks away, at 
the Supreme Court.57 His two offices reflect his two roles: the SG is an 
executive branch officer, but as the federal government’s chief appellate 
litigator, he has a close relationship with the Court. Together, they are 
emblematic of his role as the “Tenth Justice,” a distinction we discuss 
further in Part III. 
The OSG has long enjoyed special deference from the Court. At 
the certiorari stage, the Court sometimes “call[s] for the views” of the 
SG (“CVSG”) on whether to grant certiorari in a case.58 The OSG and 
other governmental litigants may file an amicus brief without the 
parties’ consent.59 They are also permitted one thousand words more 
than other amici.60 And as discussed in Part II, the Court almost always 
grants the OSG’s amicus oral argument motions, even though it almost 
always denies such motions from other parties. 
These advantages are significant: the OSG enjoys an 
unparalleled success rate before the Court. Since the 1950s, the Court 
has granted around 70% of the OSG’s certiorari petitions, compared 
with approximately 3% of other petitions.61 According to political 
scientists Ryan C. Black and Ryan J. Owens, even the Justices who 
 
 52. SUP. CT. R. 38.7 (1980). 
 53. SUP. CT. R. 28.7. 
 54. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a)-(c) (2020). 
 55. 28 U.S.C. § 505. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Waxman, supra note 7, at 3 n.4. 
 58. Stefanie A. Lepore, The Development of the Supreme Court Practice of Calling for the 
Views of the Solicitor General, 35 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 35, 35 (2010). 
 59. SUP. CT. R. 37.4. 
 60. Id. 33.1(g). 
 61. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1333. 
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disagreed with the SG’s policy preferences followed his 
recommendations 35% of the time.62 The Justices follow the SG’s lead 
“when they are ideologically distant from her, when they disagree with 
her on policy grounds, and when her recommendation contravenes the 
legal factors in the case—in short, when the only persuasive component 
of the SG’s argument is that it is being made by the SG.”63 
The OSG is similarly successful at the merits stage. In the 
second half of the twentieth century, the OSG won 60%–70% of the 
cases in which it represented a party.64 The side that the OSG supports 
as an amicus has a historical win rate of 70%–80%.65 In a study of cases 
in which the OSG participated as a party from the 1979 through the 
2007 Terms, Black and Owens found that the OSG lawyers were more 
likely to win than their opponents, even after controlling for the party’s 
resources or the opposing attorney’s experience.66 Although similar 
research suggests that the OSG’s politicization—defined as the 
percentage of briefs that match the ideology of the appointing 
president—decreases its success rate, the predicted probability of 
success on the merits is still 60% at a hypothetical maximum level  
of politicization.67 
Despite a substantial literature discussing the SG generally, few 
scholars have addressed his role in amicus oral argument. The most 
extensive treatment comes from prominent Supreme Court litigators, 
including now-Chief Justice Roberts and now-D.C. Circuit Judge 
Patricia Millet, offering advice to private litigants on how to gain the 
OSG’s support as amicus.68 Scholars have often mentioned the OSG’s 
role in amicus oral argument in passing but have not discussed the 
practice or its historical development in any detail.69 Even critics of the 
 
 62. Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 64 POL. RSCH. Q. 765, 772 (2011). Black and Owens calculate specific votes 
by relying on Justice Blackmun’s papers, which record individual votes to grant or deny certiorari. 
Id. at 769 & n.7. 
 63. Id. at 771.  
 64. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1335. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, A Built-In Advantage: The Office of the Solicitor General 
and the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 POL. RSCH. Q. 454, 461 (2013) (“[H]olding everything else equal, 
attorneys from the OSG can expect a 0.13 increase in the probability that their side will win the 
case . . . [that] is attributable exclusively to the OSG’s participation in the case.”).  
 67. Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Tenth Justice? Consequences of Politicization in the Solicitor 
General’s Office, 71 J. POL. 224, 233 fig.2 (2009). 
 68. See Millett, supra note 3; John G. Roberts, Jr., Riding the Coattails of the Solicitor 
General, 15 LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 29, 1993, at 8. 
 69. E.g., Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1331, 1355–56; Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy 
Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1519 n.140 (2008) (describing the development of OSG participation in a 
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OSG’s amicus “activism” have not focused on the distinct advantages it 
has in not only filing briefs but arguing as an amicus.70 This Article 
aims to fill that gap. 
II. DOCUMENTING AMICUS ORAL ARGUMENT  
PRACTICE AT THE SUPREME COURT 
This Part documents how amicus oral argument has grown 
dramatically since the early nineteenth century and that the SG has 
been the main generator of this growth. We begin with quantitative 
analysis and proceed to a qualitative discussion of four periods of the 
Court’s history. 
A. Quantitative Account 
Our analysis primarily relies on an original dataset of all 
motions for amicus oral argument. We constructed this dataset with 
records from the 131 annual volumes of the Journal of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, “the official minutes of the Court.”71  
The Journal contains daily entries of actions taken by the Court, 
including case dispositions, bar admissions, oral arguments, and 
rulings on motions. 
We examined all complete volumes of the Journals, which span 
the 1889 through 2019 Terms (as of publication).72 Volumes from this 
period are available in a scanned and digitized format on the Court’s 
website. We conducted both an automated and manual review of the 
Journals, excluding instances of amici appointed by the Court to defend 
the judgment below. Ultimately, our dataset included 2,298 motions for 
amicus oral argument across 1,993 cases.73 
 
footnote); Karen O’Connor, The Amicus Curiae Role of the U.S. Solicitor General in Supreme Court 
Litigation, 66 JUDICATURE 256, 260–61 (1983) (mentioning the OSG’s role in amicus oral 
arguments in only one sentence). 
 70. See Michael E. Solimine, The Solicitor General Unbound: Amicus Curiae Activism and 
Deference in the Supreme Court, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1183, 1189 (2013) (outlining the article’s focus 
on briefs filed by the OSG rather than oral arguments made by the OSG). 
 71. Journal, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/M67W-BBEJ]. 
 72. After contacting the Supreme Court Public Information Office, the Library of Congress, 
and the National Archives, we were unable to locate earlier editions of the Journal.  
 73. This count excludes thirty-nine motions for amicus oral argument made in thirty-three 
cases that either did not result in an opinion (for example, because they were dismissed as 
improvidently granted) or did not ultimately have oral argument (usually cases decided  
per curium). 
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1. The Rise of Amicus Oral Argument 
Both in raw numbers and as a percentage of the Court’s docket, 
the rise in amicus oral argument has been dramatic. As shown in 
Figures 1 and 2, amicus oral argument was very uncommon from 1889 
through the 1950s. The practice grew steeply through the second half 
of the twentieth century and, by the late 2010s, occurred in 40%–60% 
of the Court’s argued cases in a given Term. 
Much of this growth occurred in the 1960s, 1980s, 1990s, and 
2000s. In each of these decades, the percentage of cases featuring 
amicus oral argument rose by 50%–100% over the previous decade. 
Since then, the number of cases with amicus oral argument has 
continued to rise. In the last ten Terms, 47% of all cases have featured 
amicus oral argument. 
 




FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF CASES WITH AMICUS ORAL ARGUMENT 
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Our data show that the Court has exercised substantial 
discretion over amicus oral argument motions. As Figure 3 illustrates, 
there have been periods when the Court regularly denied such motions, 
especially in the 1980s. Under the Rules of the Supreme Court, denials 
should be more common in cases where the party that the amicus 
supports has withheld consent for the amicus to participate.74 We 
identified numerous instances, however, in which the Court denied 
motions for amicus oral argument made with the relevant party’s 
consent and even when the motion was made by the relevant  
party itself.75  
The rise in amicus oral argument coincided with the rise in 
amicus curiae filings more broadly. In 1946, the average number of 
amicus briefs per case was 0.5, and the median number of amicus briefs 
per case was 0.76 In 2000, the average number of amicus briefs per case 
was 5.8, and the median was 4.77 
 
FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF MOTIONS FOR AMICUS  




Although amicus participation increased through both briefs 
and oral arguments, the two practices diverged significantly in who 
 
 74. See SUP. CT. R. 28.7 (noting that motions for amicus oral arguments without consent of 
the party the amicus supports “will be granted only in the most extraordinary circumstances”). 
 75. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 1194, 1195 (1983) (mem.) (Respondent’s motion to 
permit American Bar Association to argue as amicus curiae); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 525 
U.S. 1137 (1999) (mem.) (Respondent’s motion to permit Chamber of Commerce to argue as  
amicus curiae). 
 76. Paul M. Collins, Jr., The U.S. Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Database, 1941-2001 (2008), 
https://blogs.umass.edu/pmcollins/data [https://perma.cc/7D86-JLV7]. 
 77. Id. 
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could make use of them. While amicus briefing is submitted by a wide 
variety of individuals and organizations,78 amicus oral argument has 
been increasingly monopolized by one litigant: the OSG. 
2. The OSG’s Dominance of Amicus Oral Argument 
In the 2019 Term, the Court heard twenty-seven cases with 
amicus oral argument. In all but one of them, the amicus who argued 
was the OSG. That Term is no exception. In every Term since 1980, the 
OSG argued as an amicus in at least 80% of all cases involving amicus 
oral argument. In ten of those thirty-nine Terms, the OSG was the only 
litigant permitted to argue as amicus. 
Amicus oral argument has comprised a core part of the OSG’s 
Supreme Court participation only in the last half century. Our data 
show that amicus oral argument was almost nonexistent until the 
1920s, and until then it was used primarily by the federal government 
and individual lawyers, likely appearing on behalf of unnamed clients.79 
From 1920 through the end of the 1950s, there were generally no more 
than a handful of requests for amicus oral argument each Term. Even 
this small number of amicus oral argument motions regularly included 
parties other than the SG. From 1920 through the 1950s, the OSG 
argued as an amicus in a little over a third of all cases in which any 
amicus argued. It went entire Terms without arguing as amicus at all. 
 
FIGURE 4: PERCENTAGE OF CASES WITH ARGUMENT BY AMICI,  




 78. Id. 
 79. See Krislov, supra note 21, at 703. 
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The OSG’s share of requests for amicus oral argument began 
rising in the late 1950s—and continued despite a change in the 1980 
Supreme Court Rules that required governmental entities to seek the 
consent of the party it supported when requesting amicus oral 
argument.80 In the early 1970s, the OSG made about a quarter of all 
motions for amicus oral argument. During the 2010s, the OSG filed 
almost 90% of all such motions. 
 
FIGURE 5: MOTIONS BY THE SG AS A PERCENTAGE OF  




Despite the steady increase in motions by the OSG for amicus 
oral argument, the rate at which the Court has granted these motions 
has varied over time. From the 1920s through the mid-1970s, all the 
OSG’s motions for amicus oral argument were granted, save one in 1958 
and two in 1970. But beginning in the late 1970s and persisting through 
the early 1990s, the Court regularly denied the OSG’s amicus oral 
argument motions. The 1980 Rule revision eliminating the preference 
for government amici at oral argument appeared to signal a temporary 
change in the Court’s view toward the OSG’s amicus oral argument 
participation. In the 1981 through 1988 Terms, under President 
Reagan’s SGs, Rex Lee and Charles Fried, the Court denied 14% of the 
OSG’s motions, an average of almost three-and-a-half per Term. In four 
of those eight Terms, the Court denied more than 15% of the OSG’s 
motions. As we discuss in Section II.B.3, these denials appear to have 
 
 80. See supra Section I.B. 
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reflected the Court’s displeasure with the OSG’s participation in  
certain cases. 
Beginning in 1990, however, the OSG’s grant rate recovered to 
nearly 100%. From 2011 until April 2020, the Court granted all the 
OSG’s amicus oral argument motions.  
 
FIGURE 6: GRANT RATES OF MOTIONS FOR AMICUS ORAL ARGUMENT,  




The Court has not been nearly as receptive to other parties’ 
amicus oral argument requests. As Figure 7 shows, the Court grants 
the OSG’s motions at significantly higher rates than even other 
governmental entities—the types of amici that the Rules previously 
also favored for oral argument participation. Since 1960, the Court has 
granted about 41% of amicus oral argument motions made by states 
and local governments (including governors, state agencies, state 
legislatures, state judiciaries, local governments, and local agencies) 
and an even smaller percentage of those made by organizations 
(including associations, nonprofits, and companies) and individuals.  
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FIGURE 7: GRANT RATES BY FOUR MOST COMMON  




Even when the OSG’s grant rate was at its lowest in the 1980s, 
it participated in amicus oral argument at far higher rates than other 
litigants. Over the last three decades, rejections were few and far 
between and then stopped entirely. The denials of the 1980s appear to 
have had no lasting impact on how the Court perceives its relationship 
with the OSG. In the late 1990s, when Seth Waxman served as 
President Clinton’s SG, the Court granted more than 95% of his amicus 
oral argument motions. The first time Waxman experienced one of the 
rare denials, Lawrence Wallace, then a career OSG attorney, explained 
to him these denials happened with some regularity, but that he should 
not read significance into them: “[E]very once in a while,” Wallace said, 
“they show us that they are the Supreme Court and we are not.”81 
As Figure 8 shows, amicus oral argument has occupied an 
increasing proportion of the SG’s litigation before the Court over time. 
A few decades ago, the OSG argued before the Court more frequently 
as a party than as an amicus. But in recent terms, the reverse has been 
true. Between its amicus and party cases, the OSG has argued in 69%–
88% of cases each Term since 2001, with most terms falling between 
75%–80%. At the beginning of the 1986 Term, in a harbinger of things 
to come, Justice Thurgood Marshall remarked in a memorandum 
circulated to the Justices that “the SG is about to take over  
our calendar.”82 
 
 81. Interview with Seth P. Waxman (Apr. 2019).  
 82. Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall to Chambers (Sept. 3, 1986), in Blackmun Papers, 
supra note 46, at Box 458, Folder 11. 
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By statute, the SG represents the “interests of the United 
States” in litigation.83 This interest is often called the “federal 
interest.”84 The DOJ has never issued guidance that articulates 
precisely what this interest is, though multiple SGs have defined it as 
something akin to the executive interest.85 
The only time it addressed the issue, the Court articulated a 
broad conception of the federal interest. The 1988 case United States v. 
Providence Journal Co. concerned a civil injunction against a 
newspaper.86 The district court appointed a special prosecutor to pursue 
criminal contempt charges against Respondents. When the special 
prosecutor sought to appeal to the Supreme Court, SG Fried denied him 
permission.87 Based on this denial, Respondents argued that the writ 
had to be dismissed. But both the special prosecutor and Fried argued 
 
 83. 28 U.S.C. §§ 517-518. 
 84. See, e.g., Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1332 (“[M]ost cases the Solicitor General 
enters involve legal issues that directly affect federal interests . . . .”). 
 85. See Interview with Former Senior OSG Attorney (Apr. 2019) (stating that there is rarely 
a difference between the interests of the executive branch and those of the federal government as 
a whole); Interview with Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Apr. 2019) (noting that the executive branch’s 
influence would be “diluted” if Congress also argued); Interview with Gregory G. Garre (Apr. 2019) 
(“In cases involving the constitutionality of statutes, you are filing a brief on behalf of the executive 
branch, but you have a responsibility by tradition and by statute to Congress to defend legislative 
acts . . . .”); Interview with Charles Fried (Apr. 2019) (“The Court’s holding in Providence Journal 
ignores separation of powers issues. Where Congress trenches on what the SG believes are the 
constitutional powers of the executive, the SG has not hesitated to press that concern. Bowsher v. 
Synar and Morrison v. Olson are two such cases.”). But see Interview with Senior OSG Attorney 
(May 2019) (“We think of the United States as an entity that is composed of three branches, and 
normally we can craft positions that are aligned on them.”).  
 86. 485 U.S. 693 (1988). 
 87. Id. at 698. 
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the case could go forward. In their view, it was not necessary for the SG 
to grant permission because the case did not concern an “interest[]  
of the United States.”88 Rather, it concerned the “power of the  
Judicial Branch.”89 
The Court found this view “startling.”90 “It seems to be 
elementary,” Justice Blackmun wrote for the 6-2 majority, “that even 
when exercising distinct and jealously separated powers, the three 
branches are but ‘co-ordinate parts of one government.’ ”91 Writing in 
dissent, Justice Stevens adopted the SG’s view and noted that when the 
SG is called to represent two branches, he “faces a conflict of  
interest that undeniably would be intolerable if encountered in the 
private sector.”92 
Given the Court’s broad interpretation of what constitutes the 
“interests of the United States,” we sought to understand how the SG 
conceives of that interest. We chose one Term in each of the tenures  
of six SGs—three appointed by Democratic and three by  
Republican presidents93—and examined the “interest” section in all 
their amicus briefs.94 
Across the 141 briefs we reviewed, the most common interests 
asserted were that: the executive branch administers or has the 
authority to enforce the law at issue; executive enforcement action (such 
as criminal prosecutions) depends on the law at issue; and the Court 
issued a CVSG order at the certiorari stage. On the surface, these 
results broadly accord with what Supreme Court scholars and litigators 
have claimed: that the OSG is judicious in the cases it chooses to enter 
as amicus, often opining in those whose outcomes will affect the existing 
functions of the federal government.95  
But upon closer scrutiny, these justifications are less convincing. 
First, while a CVSG reflects the Court’s interest in hearing from the 
OSG, it is unclear how a CVSG is an “interest[ ] of the United States.” 
Second, some cases that implicate the federal government’s 
enforcement authority only do so to a limited extent. For example, when 
 
 88. Id. at 700–01. 
 89. Id. at 701. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 93. The Republican appointees are Noel Francisco, Rex Lee, and Theodore B. Olson, and the 
Democratic appointees are Drew S. Days III, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., and Seth P. Waxman. 
 94. All amici are required to include such a section in their briefs. SUP. CT. R. 37.5. 
 95. See, e.g., Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1371 (“In virtually every case between 
private parties that the Solicitor General has entered, the interpretation of a federal statute has 
been at stake . . . .”). 
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the OSG is an amicus in Title VII cases, it frequently cites the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) enforcement 
authority as its interest.96 While the EEOC is statutorily authorized to 
enforce employment discrimination laws, it brings less than 2% of 
employment discrimination enforcement actions while private parties 
litigate the other 98%.97 
In a small number of cases, the OSG mustered little or even no 
justification for its amicus participation. For example, the OSG’s brief 
in Reed v. Ross,98 a case concerning the availability of federal habeas 
corpus relief when a defendant has failed to comply with a state’s 
procedural rules, stated no interest.99 
Our analysis suggests that the OSG defines the “interests of the 
United States” through norms rather than rules. Our qualitative 
account in Section II.B also supports this view: although the OSG’s 
interest in a case is often the defense of federal statutes and agency 
action, it is also willing to articulate broader and more nebulous 
interests. It is difficult to conceive of any case that would not raise a 
federal interest within the OSG’s conception. As former SG Fried told 
us, “it’s not hard to cook one up.”100 
B. Qualitative Account 
Having provided a macro-level overview of amicus oral 
argument, we now offer a more textured account of how the practice of 
amicus oral argument has evolved since 1889 and how the OSG has 
come to dominate it.  
We divide the Court’s history into four phases based on our 
analysis of how the OSG has employed amicus oral argument. We rely 
on our own analyses of each case as well as the issue classifications in 
the U.S. Supreme Court Database.101 During the first phase, from 1889 
 
 96. See, e.g., Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1–2, O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 
308 (1996) (No. 95-354); Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1–2, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 
(1997) (No. 95-1376).  
 97. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1149–50 (2012). 
 98. 468 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 99. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Reed v. Ross, 
468 U.S. 1 (1984) (No. 83-218).  
 100. Interview with Fried, supra note 85. 
 101. Harold J. Spaeth, Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, Theodore J. Ruger & 
Sara C. Benesh, Version 2020 Release 01, SUP. CT. DATABASE (Sept. 21, 2020), 
http://supremecourtdatabase.org [https://perma.cc/J5MH-CQYG]. 
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to the 1930s, we show that the early amicus oral argument practice was 
used by a small number of litigants and that the OSG requested amicus 
oral argument almost exclusively in cases involving federal statutes. 
From the 1940s through the 1960s, the OSG began defending federal 
agencies and, increasingly, civil rights and political interests.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, the OSG requested amicus oral 
argument in cases in which the federal interest was increasingly 
tenuous and the political interest was great. For a brief period, the 
Court denied some of these requests. Archival research suggests that 
the Court strategically used denials to signal the Court’s disapproval of 
the SG’s increasingly politicized positions.102 Finally, from the 2000s to 
the present, the Court initially denied a handful of these motions and 
then, from 2011 until April 2020, granted all the OSG’s motions to be 
heard—regardless of whether the case was political. 
1. 1889 Through 1930s 
In the early nineteenth century, oral argument at the Court was 
very different than it is today. Advocates could speak as long as they 
wished, and the Justices asked no questions and paid limited 
attention.103 As its docket grew, the Court in 1849 limited argument 
time to two hours for each side and began to closely question counsel 
rather than listen passively.104 By the early 1900s, the Court had cut 
argument time to thirty minutes for each side.105 These changes 
increased the stakes of oral argument and the importance of having a 
high-quality oralist for litigants and the Court alike. 
The practice of amicus oral argument was virtually nonexistent 
before the 1920s, and it became only slightly more prevalent in the 
following two decades. The federal government was the second-most 
frequent movant for such participation—behind individual lawyers, 
likely filing on behalf of unnamed clients106—and its requests were 
never denied.107 Local governments and foreign sovereigns made few 
requests to appear at oral argument as amici, but these requests were 
 
 102. See infra notes 229–230 and accompanying text. 
 103. Stephen M. Shapiro, Oral Argument in the Supreme Court: The Felt Necessities of the 
Time, Y.B.: SUP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y 22, 23 (1985). 
 104. Id. at 25–26. 
 105. Id. at 26. 
 106. See Krislov, supra note 21, at 703. 
 107. Before the 1950s, the editions of the Journal appear to be somewhat incomplete. For 
example, some motions are noted as having been submitted but no decision as to their disposition 
is evident. 
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also always granted.108 On the other hand, the Court denied many  
such requests on behalf of individual lawyers and all those made  
by companies.109  
From 1889 through the 1930s, the OSG requested amicus oral 
argument primarily in cases where a federal interest was clear and its 
position intuitive. Its most common position was defending the 
constitutionality of a federal statute.110 The OSG also entered cases 
involving federal supremacy111 and quasi-party interests112 of the 
executive branch.113 The OSG only entered cases involving a federal 
statute or, in one instance, whether the Senate could reconsider the 
nomination of a federal official it had already confirmed.114  
The OSG did not request oral argument in most cases in which 
it filed an amicus brief.115 When the interests of the United States arose 
out of a particular department of the federal government, a 
representative of that department often appeared at argument instead 
of an OSG attorney.116 In other cases, an OSG lawyer argued on behalf 
of an agency but in the agency’s name.117 
 
 108. See, e.g., Dillon v. Strathearn S.S. Co., 39 S. Ct. 495 (1919) (mem.) (granting motion for 
the British Embassy to participate in amicus oral argument). 
 109.  The Court first invited a litigant to argue in 1926. See J. SUP. CT. U.S., Oct. Term, 1924, 
at 182 (inviting George Wharton Pepper to argue in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)). It 
continued to issue such invitations until 1970, but fairly infrequently and only to the federal 
government and states. Grant rates discussed throughout this Article exclude those invitations, 
though the invitations themselves are noted in some instances. 
 110. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n 
No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) (No. 324) (Railroad Labor Act); Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae, Ky. Whip & Collar Co. v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 299 U.S. 334 (1937) (No. 138) (Ashurst-
Sumners Act); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Moor v. Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co., 
297 U.S. 101 (1936) (No. 49) (Bankhead Act). 
 111. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Burnes Nat’l Bank of St. Joseph v. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17, 20 
(1924); First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 644 (1924); Holyoke Water Power 
Co. v. Am. Writing Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324, 332 (1937). 
 112. We use this term to refer to a person or entity who is a party “in the guise of an amicus 
curiae,” or who is a party in all but name. See Krislov, supra note 21, at 701. A “quasi-party” has 
a concrete, and often pecuniary or sovereign, interest in a case. 
 113. See, e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108 (1925) (defending the president’s pardon 
power); United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932) (arguing for the validity of a presidential 
appointment to the Federal Power Commission). 
 114. See United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932).  
 115. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 380 (1920) (noting that the United States filed 
an amicus brief, although no representative of the United States appeared at oral argument). 
 116. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Cal. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 389 (1938) (argued 
by a lawyer for the Federal Power Commission); Smith, 286 U.S. at 14 (argued by the Attorney 
General); see also Robert L. Stern, The Solicitor General’s Office and Administrative Agency 
Litigation, 46 A.B.A. J. 154, 155 (1960) (noting that lawyers outside the OSG argued around half 
the cases in which the SG’s office was involved). 
 117. See, e.g., Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 513–14 (1941) (arguing for the 
Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus). 
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Other amici who requested oral argument used the role to 
pursue quasi-party interests. For example, the City of Oakland 
requested oral argument time in a case involving a dispute over its 
borders.118 One state was permitted to argue on behalf of twenty-six 
others in a case regarding the federal taxation of state employees.119 
The British Embassy sought argument in a case about whether U.S. 
courts had jurisdiction over a British vessel engaged in business on 
behalf of the British government.120 
But by the end of this period, the Court began to shift away from 
simply resolving disputes between parties or quasi-party interests. The 
Judiciary Act of 1925—lobbied for by Chief Justice William H. Taft—
gave the Court plenary power over all but a few classes of cases.121 No 
longer the mere “vindicator of all federal rights”122 for the particular 
litigants before it, this new Court largely chose its docket and was “a 
constitutional tribunal that resolved public policy issues of national 
importance.”123 As a result, it was much more important that each of 
the Court’s opinions be correctly decided and carefully reasoned, and 
many more entities stood to gain or lose from each decision. 
Following backlash to several decisions striking down popular 
legislation, the Court also became more sensitive to its role in shaping 
public policy. In the 1920s, after the Court struck down several child 
labor laws, Senator William E. Borah proposed legislation requiring at 
least seven votes on the Court to declare a federal or state statute 
unconstitutional.124 This proposal was a feature of the 1924 presidential 
campaign,125 and several of the Justices’ letters from this period 
indicate that they were affected by this attack.126 A little over a decade 
later, the Court again came under criticism when it invalidated several 
parts of New Deal legislation.127 Frustrated with the Court’s obstruction 
 
 118. See California v. S. Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229, 254 (1895). 
 119. See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 407 (1938). 
 120. See Ex parte in re Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 524 (1921). 
 121. Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (2011). 
 122. Post, supra note 16, at 1272 (2001) (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, 
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 260–61 (1928)). 
 123. Id. at 1273 n.29 (quoting Fish, supra note 16, at 476, 477). 
 124. Steven F. Lawson, Progressives and the Supreme Court: A Case for Judicial Reform in the 
1920s, 42 HISTORIAN 419, 425 (1980). 
 125. See id. at 430–31. 
 126. See Post, supra note 16, at 1317–18 (describing comments made by Chief Justice Taft and 
Justice Brandeis). 
 127. See S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 2340–43 (2017) (listing New Deal-era federal statutes struck 
down by the Court). 
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and emboldened by a sweeping reelection victory,128 President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt launched his court-packing plan. This threat is widely 
understood as having motivated Justice Owen Roberts’s “switch in 
time”129 and having permanently changed the Court’s approach to 
reviewing the constitutionality of legislation. 
The Court’s new approach treated legislative solutions to social 
problems as motivated by the will of the people and thus meriting a 
more restrained form of judicial review.130 Footnote four of the Carolene 
Products131 opinion, which laid out guidelines defining rational basis 
review for certain legislation, captures this sentiment.132 The Court’s 
new deferential standard of review applied not only to Congress but also 
to the newly created agencies that administered, interpreted, and 
enforced the new federal programs Congress created.133 
With this newfound sensitivity towards its role in setting public 
policy, the Court needed voices to describe the pragmatic interests at 
stake in the cases that came before it. In the coming decades, the 
dominant voice would be that of the SG.  
2. 1940s Through 1960s 
From the 1940s through the 1960s, amicus participation at oral 
argument grew significantly. Amici filed fewer than fifty motions 
requesting oral argument each decade before the 1940s. By the 1960s, 
that number had increased fivefold.134 Across this period, the OSG 
accounted for approximately 31% of the motions for amicus oral 
argument, while states and associations accounted for most of the 
remaining growth. 
The Court granted 84% of states’ motions, over 80% of those by 
local governments, and all those by segments of the federal legislative 
 
 128. See Elizabeth C. Price, Constitutional Fidelity and the Commerce Clause: A Reply to 
Professor Ackerman, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 157 (1998) (noting the decisive wins of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Democrats in 1932). 
 129. But see LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 175–76 (Macmillan 1967) (arguing that Justice Roberts began to change his interpretation 
of the Constitution before President Roosevelt announced his court packing plan). 
 130. See Alfred C. Aman Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory 
Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1112 (1988) 
(discussing how Justice Frankfurter and others were “convinced of the primacy of the legislature 
in [solving] societal problems”). 
 131. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 132. Aman, supra note 130, at 1112. 
 133. See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing Supreme Court amicus practice from the 1940s 
through the 1960s).  
 134. There were ninety-seven such motions in the 1940s, eighty-two in the 1950s, and 193 in 
the 1960s. See supra Figure 3. 
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and judicial branches. On the other hand, it granted only around half 
of such motions made by companies and associations, 36% of those 
made by nonprofits, and 11% of those made by individuals. 
According to one contemporary perspective, the Court viewed 
the rise in amicus participation by individuals and other 
nongovernment entities as largely unhelpful.135 Increasingly, amicus 
briefs were repetitive of the party briefs, seemed focused on an audience 
of clients and donors rather than the Justices, and treated the Court as 
though it were a political body that could be lobbied.136 States, too, 
began asking to be heard at oral argument in cases where their interest 
was no stronger than any other state’s.137 The Court generally denied 
these types of requests but permitted (or invited) states to argue when 
they had a distinct interest in the case.138 
During this period, the Court continued to grant all the OSG’s 
amicus oral argument motions, with one exception. In 1958, the Court 
issued its first denial of an OSG motion for amicus oral argument. The 
case was United New York and New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots’ 
Association v. Halecki, a maritime dispute arising out of a state 
negligence claim about the applicability of the warranty of 
“seaworthiness” to ships that are out of regular operation.139 The OSG’s 
brief justified its participation purely on economic grounds: the federal 
government was “the world’s largest shipowner.”140  
This denial prompted an unusual reaction from two Justices. 
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan noted that they would have granted 
the motion “in view of the important public interest with which the 
Government is charged in carrying out the congressional policy for a 
Government-owned merchant marine and in view of the confused state 
 
 135. Fowler V. Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 
1172, 1172 (1953). 
 136. Id. at 1173–74. 
 137. See, e.g., Ry. Emps. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (permitting Nebraska to 
participate in amicus oral argument in a labor union dispute arising under Nebraska law but 
denying requests by other states); King v. United States, 344 U.S. 254 (1952) (rates case involving 
Florida railroads); see also J. SUP. CT. U.S., Oct. Term, 1952, at 11 (denying request by Montana 
and Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of Montana to participate in amicus oral 
argument in King v. United States). 
 138. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 353 U.S. 979 (1957) (inviting Attorney General of 
California to file a brief and participate in oral argument); Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253 (1944) 
(permitting group of community property states to have one representative amicus at oral 
argument in case about federal tax treatment of community property); United States v. 
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (permitting Virginia to participate in amicus 
oral argument in a dispute about the Federal Power Commission’s ability to regulate on a body of 
water owned by Virginia under common law). 
 139. 358 U.S. 613 (1959). 
 140. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (No. 56). 
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of the law dealing with the issues raised by this case.”141 In other words, 
at least two Justices believed the OSG’s participation was justified 
because it represented the federal government and its skilled lawyers 
would be of aid to the Court. For over a decade, the denial in Halecki 
remained an anomaly. 
Compared to other amici, the OSG’s requests were likely granted 
more often because many of them came in cases involving executive 
agencies.142 Through the early decades of the twentieth century, courts 
deferred considerably to agencies on questions of fact, but not law.143 
Beginning in the 1940s, however, the Court deferred to agency 
interpretations even regarding questions of law.144 During this period, 
the Court also invited the OSG to file amicus briefs and appear at oral 
argument in a small number of cases involving the interpretation of 
federal statutes.145 
But deference toward executive agencies cannot entirely explain 
the Court’s behavior. In 1948, the Court began granting the OSG 
amicus oral argument in a category of cases that had little to do with 
executive agencies but would occupy an increasingly large part of its 
Supreme Court practice: racial discrimination. 
Shelley v. Kraemer146 was the first civil rights case involving 
racial discrimination in which the federal government asked to argue 
as amicus.147 It concerned the constitutionality of racial covenants on 
residential property. The Truman White House was involved in both 
the decision to participate and the writing of the government’s brief,148 
 
 141. J. SUP. CT. U.S., Oct. Term, 1958, at 10. 
 142. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. 
State Lab. Rels. Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1946) (Nos. 55, 76) (advancing the NLRB’s settled 
interpretation of the NLRA). 
 143. Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE 
L.J. 908, 969 (2017). This deference was justified primarily on the basis of agency expertise. John 
J. Coughlin, The History of the Judicial Review of Administrative Power and the Future of 
Regulatory Governance, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 89, 114 (2001); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in 
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1193–94 (1986). During this period, even when a 
member of the OSG represented the government at oral argument (as is almost always the case 
today), its amicus briefs were often filed in the name of an executive agency. See, e.g., Brief for the 
NLRB as Amicus Curiae, Int’l Union of United Auto. v. O’Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950) (No. 456). 
 144. Bamzai, supra note 143, at 997–1000. 
 145. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Pac. Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Dep’t 
of Agric., 318 U.S. 285 (1943) (No. 275); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Wash. 
Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 319 U.S. 732 (1943) (No. 28). 
 146. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 147. This is based on our review of all pre-Shelley cases in which the federal government 
requested amicus oral argument.  
 148. Philip Elman & Norman Silber, The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and 
Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 818-19 (1987). 
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which, unusually, featured the AG’s name before the SG’s.149 The 
government extensively justified the “interest[ ] of the United States” 
in a section that spanned twenty-five pages.150 (Today, interest sections 
are often only a paragraph long.151) The interest statement referenced 
officials from agencies ranging from the Housing and Home Finance 
Agency to the State Department.152 It began, “The Federal Government 
has a special responsibility for the protection of the fundamental civil 
rights guaranteed to the people by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.”153 
The statement adopts an extraordinarily expansive view of the 
federal interest. Under this view, the federal government has an 
interest in any case involving constitutional interpretation of civil 
rights—even if federal law and administrative policy are silent on the 
issue. When Shelley was being litigated at the Supreme Court, federal 
prohibitions on racial discrimination were minimal.154 Thus, the 
Truman Administration could support whichever side of the case it 
favored politically. 
The white property owners involved in the case wrote a reply 
brief rebutting the government’s participation. By supporting 
Petitioners, they argued, the government sought to elevate the rights of 
some of its citizens (Blacks) over those of others (whites).155 While this 
analysis is analytically flawed, it demonstrates how the government’s 
“interest” in protecting constitutional rights generally did not dictate 
its position in a case about what those rights in fact are. The OSG’s 
position in race discrimination cases since Shelley v. Kraemer has 
generally turned on which party controls the executive branch.156 
 
 149. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 123, Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 (Nos. 72, 87, 
290, 291). 
 150. The federal government was not required to justify its interest in a given case during this 
period. SUP. CT. R. 42 (1970) (repealed 1980); see also CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 196, 311 n.41. The 
entire brief was 123 pages long. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 149. 
 151. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, City of 
Hays v. Vogt, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) (No. 16-1495). 
 152. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 149, at 5, 13, 15, 19. 
 153. Id. at 1–2. 
 154. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination 
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 447 (2000). The federal government had 
begun to support actions against states to combat racial discrimination, however. See, e.g., Brief 
for the United States, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (No. 25) (writing in favor 
of Plaintiff, who experienced racial discrimination on a railway dining car). 
 155. Brief for Respondents in Reply to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 1–2, Shelley 
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (Nos. 72, 87). 
 156. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Fisher 
v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11–345) (supporting university in affirmative action 
lawsuit); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Grutter v. Bollinger, 
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The OSG submitted another controversial brief in Brown v. 
Board of Education.157 The brief again extensively justified the federal 
interest in the case, even citing President Eisenhower’s public 
statements.158 The AG’s office authored the brief, and the AG and his 
Special Assistant—rather than the OSG—signed it.159 Perhaps 
preempting allegations that their position was motivated by politics, 
the authors declared that “[r]ecognition of the responsibility of the 
Federal Government with regard to civil rights is not a matter of 
partisan controversy.”160 The school board did not bother to oppose the 
government’s participation, maybe because it perceived that the Court 
wanted to hear from various government actors.161  
By the 1960s, civil rights cases were a significant portion of the 
OSG’s amicus oral arguments. Between 1960 and 1969, the OSG argued 
as amicus in more than thirty civil rights cases, claiming that local 
ordinances,162 state statutes,163 and apportionment plans164 violated the 
Equal Protection Clause while school board desegregation plans did 
not.165 In these cases, and until the Reagan Administration, the OSG 
supported civil rights claimants regardless of the president’s party.166 
The SG himself generally argued these cases.167 
The OSG began to participate in oral argument in a small 
number of other cases in which the federal interest was tenuous as well. 
One of the most notable was Baker v. Carr, the landmark case that 
allowed the Court to review redistricting decisions.168 The OSG’s brief 
listed the SG as its author and contained no justification for his 
 
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02–241) (supporting rejected applicant in affirmative action lawsuit); 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 434 U.S. 810 
(1978) (No. 76–811) (supporting university in affirmative action lawsuit). 
 157. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 158. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2–8, Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (Nos. 1, 2,  
4, 10). 
 159. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 26–28, 31–32. 
 160. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 158, at 2.  
 161. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495–96 (announcing that, on re-argument, “[t]he Attorney General 
of the United States is again invited to participate” and “[t]he Attorneys General of the states 
requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici 
curiae upon request to do so”). 
 162. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1965); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 
244 (1962). 
 163. See, e.g., Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964). 
 164. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 165. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964). 
 166. Brett W. Curry, Richard L. Pacelle, Jr. & Bryan W. Marshall, “An Informal and Limited 
Alliance”: The President and the Supreme Court, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 223, 240 (2008). 
 167. See, e.g., Sims, 377 U.S. 533; Peterson, 373 U.S. 244.  
 168. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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participation.169 In his memoir, then-SG Archibald Cox recounted 
having a “frankly political discussion with the White House about the 
position that the government would take.”170 
One explanation for why the Court was willing to hear from the 
OSG on political cases is politics. During this period, Democrats 
controlled the White House—and thus the OSG—almost exclusively.171 
The Court was newly liberal and political under Chief Justice Earl 
Warren.172 And the Warren Court was the first to issue a CVSG order.173 
But even prior to Chief Justice Warren’s ascension, the Court had 
granted all the OSG’s amicus oral argument motions. As a result,  
the Court’s willingness to listen to the OSG cannot be explained by 
politics alone. 
3. 1970s Through 1990s 
From the 1970s through the 1990s, the OSG’s amicus oral 
argument requests grew significantly. This period—especially the 
1980s—also marked the first time that the Court denied these requests 
with any regularity. 
During these three decades, the OSG began to request oral 
argument more frequently when it filed a brief. Between 1970 and 1975, 
the OSG requested amicus oral argument in 42% of the cases in which 
it filed an amicus brief. From 1995 to 1999, it did so 94% of the time. In 
1995, then-SG Drew Days testified to Congress that, as a matter  
of policy, the OSG sought oral argument whenever it filed an  
amicus brief.174 
The types of cases in which the OSG requested amicus oral 
argument also expanded over this period. For the first time, the OSG 
entered cases involving habeas corpus review of a state conviction,175 
 
 169. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Baker, 369 U.S. 186 (No. 6). 
 170. ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 297 (1987). 
 171. President Eisenhower was the only exception, and he supported the government’s 
participation in Brown. See CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 28. 
 172. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT (1973); PHILIP B. 
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT (1970). 
 173. The first time the Court invited the SG to opine in this manner was in Tennessee Burley 
Tobacco Growers Ass’n v. Range, 353 U.S. 981 (1957). For a different explanation of CVSG, see 
Lepore, supra note 58 (arguing that members of the OSG were friendly with some of the Justices). 
 174. Examining the Operation and Activities of the Office of the Solicitor General of the 
Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 5 (1995) 
(statement of Hon. Drew S. Days, III, Solicitor General, Department of Justice). 
 175. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
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affirmative action,176 abortion,177 and the establishment of religion.178 
The OSG continues to participate in these types of cases today. 
At the same time, the Court generally chose not to hear from 
companies, individuals, associations, and nonprofits.179 It also denied 
two-thirds of requests made by foreign sovereigns and Native American 
tribes. And for the first time, the Court also denied a large majority of 
motions made by states, granting only 32% of such motions, down 
significantly from the previous period.180 The Justices were much more 
willing to grant states’ motions in cases in which the state had a unique 
interest in the case, including those involving a quasi-party interest,181 
federal preemption of state and local law,182 or a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a state law.183 But the Court often denied states’ 
motions to be heard in cases arising out of other states,184 except when 
made on behalf of a large group of states.185 Perhaps in response to the 
Court’s steeply shrinking docket and its increased opposition to non-
OSG motions for amicus oral argument, the number of such motions—
which had risen fairly steadily since the 1930s—began declining in the 
late 1980s and then fell steeply through the 1990s.186 
The most significant shift in the Court’s amicus oral argument 
practice during this period was that it began denying motions by the 
OSG. At the same conference at the beginning of the 1970 Term, the 
 
 176. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 177. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1982). 
 178. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The SG’s motion to appear at oral argument 
in Marsh v. Chambers was denied, but his motion one year later to participate in Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), was granted.  
 179. It granted about 8% of motions made by companies and none of the thirty-two motions 
made by individuals. Motions from associations and nonprofits were granted at a rate of 16% and 
14%, respectively. 
 180. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.  
 181. See, e.g., Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 469 U.S. 1204 (1985) (mem.) 
(granting the State of Montana’s motion in case involving an insurance dispute over an incident 
that occurred on Indian reservation on land owned by Montana). 
 182. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 409 U.S. 1073 (1972) (granting 
the Attorney General of California’s motion in case about federal preemption of local ordinance). 
 183. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 414 U.S. 1107 (1973) (mem.) (granting Attorney General 
of California’s motion in case concerning constitutionality of state law). But see, e.g., Goldstein v. 
California, 409 U.S. 976 (1972) (mem.) (denying the California Attorney General’s motion to 
participate in a case in which the state was already represented by the Los Angeles City Attorney). 
 184. See, e.g., Wingo v. Wedding, 416 U.S. 934 (1974) (mem.) (denying the California Attorney 
General’s motion in case arising out of Kentucky). But see, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 951 
(1972) (mem.) (granting the California Attorney General’s motion to participate in a case arising 
out of Illinois and under the federal constitution). 
 185. See, e.g., Brief for State of New Jersey, Amicus Curiae at i, Zicarelli v. N.J. State Comm’n 
of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1971) (No. 69-4) (on behalf of New Jersey and twenty-four  
other states). 
 186. See supra Figure 2, Figure 5.  
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Court issued the first two denials in this period—the second and third 
ever. One was in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the landmark case that 
defined the evidentiary standard under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 as requiring proof of discriminatory effect in employment 
practices.187 This was one of the first motions by the OSG to appear at 
oral argument that the Burger Court considered, and it came in a case 
interpreting a federal statute administered and sometimes enforced by 
an executive agency.188 The Court had issued a CVSG and followed the 
OSG’s recommendation to hear the case.189 The OSG’s brief discussed, 
among other things, EEOC guidelines governing employment tests and 
screening devices like those at issue in the case.190 The Court then 
denied the OSG’s request to argue as an amicus.191 Meanwhile, the 
Chamber of Commerce, which supported Respondents and urged that 
the EEOC guidelines were “entitled to little deference,”192 was 
permitted to argue as amicus.  
The second denial that Term came in James v. Valtierra, which 
concerned discrimination based on wealth.193 California voters had 
adopted a state constitutional amendment that prohibited the 
construction of low-rent housing projects—including federally assisted 
housing—unless approved by a community election.194 Plaintiffs 
claimed that the amendment violated the Supremacy and Equal 
Protection Clauses.195 The OSG’s brief agreed with the Equal Protection 
claim and thus declined to address the former.196 
It is not clear why the Court denied these requests. The Court 
permitted the OSG to argue in other civil rights cases during this Term 
and others.197 And aside from Warren Burger’s replacement of Earl 
Warren, no other personnel changes had occurred. 
 
 187. 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1970).  
 188. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4–5, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 124). 
 189. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 398 U.S. 926 (1970) (mem.); see also David J. Garrow, 
Toward a Definitive History of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 67 VAND. L. REV. 197, 221 (2014) (“The 
justices discussed the case on May 22, 1970, and decided to request from Solicitor General Erwin 
Griswold the executive branch’s view of whether Griggs should be heard.”). 
 190. Garrow, supra note 189, at 222. 
 191. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 400 U.S. 861 (1970) (mem.). 
 192. Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America 
at 6, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (No. 70-124). 
 193. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). 
 194. Id. at 138-39. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (Nos. 
154, 226). 
 197. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Macklenburg Bd. of Educ., 400 U.S. 802 (1970) (mem.). 
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The Court also denied five amicus oral argument motions made 
by SG Wade H. McCree Jr. (appointed by Jimmy Carter). Two were civil 
rights cases, one under Title VII198 and another about affirmative 
action;199 one was a case concerning searches under the Fourth 
Amendment;200 and a fourth was an eminent domain claim resolved on 
procedural grounds.201 The last was a securities case in which the 
Securities and Exchange Commission filed an amicus brief supporting 
the opposite side of the OSG and was permitted to argue.202 
During the Reagan Administration, the OSG’s grant rate fell 
under SG Rex Lee from a grant rate of 95% in the 1970s to 91% during 
the 1981 through 1984 Terms. The rate fell further during Charles 
Fried’s tenure (1985 through 1988 Terms) to an average of 81%, even 
collapsing to 72% in the 1987 Term. Denials came in a variety of cases, 
including those considering the constitutionality of state statutes,203 
state action,204 federal preemption,205 and even construction of federal 
statutes administered and enforced in whole or in part by federal 
agencies206—including in cases where the relevant agency cosigned  the 
brief.207 Under Fried, those denials also included cases in which the 
Court had issued CVSGs.208 But the Court always granted the  
OSG’s motions to be heard in cases deciding the constitutionality of a 
federal statute. 
The Court’s apparent reasons for these denials were varied. 
Some were mundane, including because the OSG requested additional 
time for oral argument (i.e., a party did not agree to cede time to the 
 
 198. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 435 U.S. 940 (1978) (mem.). 
 199. See Minnick v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 449 U.S. 947 (1980) (mem.). 
 200. See Franks v. Delaware, 434 U.S. 1044 (1978) (mem.). 
 201. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 449 U.S. 946 (1980) (mem.). 
 202. See Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 890 (1978) (mem.). 
 203. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 467 U.S. 1258 (1984) (mem.); Washington v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 454 U.S. 1138 (1982) (mem.). 
 204. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 488 U.S. 1001 (1989) (mem.); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 483 U.S. 
1055 (1987) (mem.); Turner v. Safley, 479 U.S. 808 (1986) (mem.); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 
473 U.S. 932 (1985) (mem.); Marsh v. Chambers, 459 U.S. 1143 (1983) (mem.). 
 205. See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 479 U.S. 1052 (1987) (mem.). 
 206. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 479 U.S. 1079 (1987) (mem.); Landreth Timber 
Co. v. Landreth, 469 U.S. 1187 (1985) (mem.). 
 207. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 454 U.S. 960 (1981) (mem.) (denying SG’s 
motion on brief cosigned by EEOC in a case interpreting Title VII). 
 208. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 484 U.S. 1000 (1988) (mem.) (denial); Patrick v. Burget, 480 
U.S. 904 (1987) (mem.) (CVSG); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 484 U.S. 893 (1987) (mem.) 
(denial); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 481 U.S. 1012 (1987) (mem.) (CVSG); Norwest Bank 
Worthington v. Ahlers, 484 U.S. 809 (1987) (mem.) (denial); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 
479 U.S. 1081 (1987) (mem.) (CVSG). Because four votes are required to issue a CVSG and five to 
grant amicus oral argument, this trend suggests that one Justice may have made the difference in 
at least some of these denials. 
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OSG or the OSG sought additional time beyond what the party ceded)209 
or sought argument before filing a brief.210 
In other cases, the Justices seemed to deny the OSG’s motion on 
substantive grounds. For example, in a bankruptcy case,211 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist recommended denying the OSG’s motion because its 
interest was no different from that of the party it supported and because 
its arguments were “adequately presented in its amicus brief.”212 The 
Chief Justice offered similar reasoning in Lowenfield v. Phelps,213 a 
habeas case.214 The Chief Justice’s recommendations did not, however, 
consistently discuss whether the OSG offered a distinct interest. For 
example, he recommended granted the OSG’s motions for divided 
argument in many criminal cases even when its interest appeared to be 
the same as that of the party it supported.215 
In still other cases, the Court seemed skeptical that the OSG had 
any interest in the case, distinct or otherwise. In one case, the OSG 
submitted a late request for amicus oral argument on behalf of the 
EEOC, and the opposing party responded that the federal interest was 
weak. The Chief Justice suggested the Court deny the motion, and it 
did so.216 The same was true in Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser,217 a case with strong political overtones but without, as the 
Chief Justice noted, “any strong federal interest.”218 
Some Justices even questioned the helpfulness of the OSG’s 
participation in cases that implicated executive power. The Chief 
Justice recommended denying the OSG’s motion for amicus oral 
 
 209. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice 1 (Mar. 23, 1978), in Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 46, at Box 255, Folder 9 (Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters); Memorandum for the 
Conference from the Chief Justice 2 (Jan. 18, 1978), id. (Franks v. Delaware); Memorandum for 
the Conference from the Chief Justice 2 (Aug. 9, 1985), id. at Box 431, Folder 9 (Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.). 
 210. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice 4 (Oct. 30, 1980), id. at Box 317, 
Folder 15 (Minnick v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs.). 
 211. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988). 
 212. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice (Sept. 24, 1987), in Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 46, at Box 485, Folder 12. 
 213. 484 U.S. 231 (1988). 
 214. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice 4 (Sept. 10, 1987), in Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 46, at Box 485, Folder 12. 
 215. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice 4 (Oct. 9, 1985), id. at 
Box 431, Folder 9 (Sielaff v. Carrier); Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice 8 
(Jan. 9, 1986), id. at Box 458, Folder 12 (Rose v. Clark). The conference memoranda do not discuss 
the similarity of interests, simply noting that the “views of the SG may be helpful.” 
 216. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice (Mar. 3, 1983), id. at Box 362, 
Folder 13 (Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker). 
 217. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 218. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice 4–5 (Jan. 9, 1986), in Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 46, at Box 431, Folder 9. 
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argument in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, a case 
interpreting the Hague Convention.219 The Chief Justice’s 
memorandum reported the OSG’s stated interest: that the United 
States was a party to and participated in the negotiation of the Hague 
Convention. On its face, cases affecting foreign relations are exactly the 
type in which the OSG might be most helpful. But the Chief Justice’s 
conference memorandum stated that the OSG’s interest was the same 
as the interest advanced by the party it supported, so its participation 
at argument was unlikely to help the Court.220 
Some denials were unmistakably intended to send a message. In 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,221 
SG Fried urged the Court to reverse Roe v. Wade.222 The OSG’s brief 
was signed by only Fried himself and two senior members of the AG’s 
office, without any of the OSG attorneys who typically write such briefs. 
In his personal notes about the brief, Justice Blackmun noted next to 
the list of the ostensible authors, “not written by any of these.”223 
Three years earlier, the Court had declined to reverse Roe in a 
case that Fried, who then occupied the Principal Deputy position in the 
OSG,224 briefed and argued as amicus.225 The Court denied the OSG’s 
motion for amicus oral argument in Thornburgh.226 The first draft of 
Justice Blackmun’s opinion read in part: 
Although appellants challenge the merits of the Third Circuit’s decision solely on the 
ground that the Court of Appeals misapplied Roe v. Wade and its successors, the Solicitor 
General, appearing on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae in support of 
appellants, urges that we take this occasion to overrule those cases entirely. For the 
Solicitor General to ask us to discard a line of major constitutional rulings in a case  
where no party has made a similar request is, to say the least, unusual. We decline  
his invitation.227 
This paragraph was not included in the final opinion,228 
apparently at Justice Powell’s request. Agreeing that “it is indeed 
 
 219. 486 U.S. 694 (1988). 
 220. Memorandum for the Conference from the Chief Justice (Jan. 6, 1988), in Blackmun 
Papers, supra note 46, at Box 485, Folder 12. The Court ultimately granted the motion. See 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 484 U.S. 1000 (1988). 
 221. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 222. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 223. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, Thornburgh, 476 
U.S. 747 (Nos. 84-495, 84-1379), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 46, at Box 435,  
Folder 2.  
 224. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 135. 
 225. See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 459 U.S. 814 (1982). 
 226. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 473 U.S. 931 (1985). 
 227. Draft Opinion, Justice Blackmun, in Blackmun Papers, supra note 46, at Box 435,  
Folder 2. 
 228. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747.  
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‘unusual’ for the Solicitor General, as an amicus curiae, to ask us to 
overrule major constitutional decisions,” Justice Powell urged Justice 
Blackmun to refrain from “criticiz[ing] the Solicitor General 
specifically.”229 He added, “we have already rebuffed the Solicitor 
General to some extent by denying his request to argue orally.”230 
Similar rebukes of positions taken by Fried did make it into final 
opinions that same Term. For example, in a criminal case, the Court 
noted that it was again declining to adopt an argument advanced by the 
SG that it had “expressly rejected when the Solicitor General made it 
in [a previous case].”231 
4. 2000 Through 2019 
In the last two decades, the number of motions for amicus oral 
argument filed by litigants other than the OSG has continued to fall. 
No more than fifteen such motions have been filed in a Term since 2000, 
and grant rates have remained steady and low. Only one motion by a 
nonprofit was granted during the entire period.232 The only motions by 
an individual that were granted were by a professor who presented a 
jurisdictional issue not raised by the parties.233 The two motions by 
associations and one by a company that the Court granted were all 
made by litigants who were either experts in the subject at issue234 or 
quasi-parties.235 They also advanced unique arguments and, in two 
cases, were represented by well-known lawyers.236 
 
 229. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Harry A. Blackmun re Thornburg v. American 
College (Feb. 6, 1986), in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Box 123, Supreme Court Case Files 
Collection 64, 64 (on file with the Washington & Lee University School of Law Library), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1159&context=casefiles 
[https://perma.cc/9RXK-4PFK]. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 175 n.11 (1985). 
 232. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 1029 (2008) (mem.) (American 
Antitrust Institute). 
 233. See Note, Ortiz v. United States, 132 HARV. L. REV. 317, 319 (2018) (noting that Professor 
Aditya Bamzai argued the Supreme Court did not have appellate or original Article III jurisdiction 
to hear Ortiz v. United States); see also Cox v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 576 (2018) (mem.); 
Dalmazzi v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 576 (2018) (mem.); Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 576 
(2018) (mem.). 
 234. See Alabama v. Shelton, 534 U.S. 1110 (2002) (mem.) (National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers). 
 235. See FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 536 U.S. 955 (2002) (mem.) (Creditors of 
NextWave Personal Communications Inc.); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002) 
(United Mine Workers of America Combined Fund). 
 236. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 657 (2002) (Steven Duke); FCC v. NextWave Pers. 
Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 295 (2003) (Laurence Tribe). 
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The situation has improved somewhat for sovereignties and 
states. All three motions made on behalf of foreign countries—in each 
case, advancing quasi-party interests and represented by experienced 
members of the Supreme Court bar and former OSG attorneys237—were 
granted. A motion by the Narragansett Indian Tribe was denied.238 
Grant rates for state motions rose from 32% between the 1970s and 
1990s to 46% after 2000. As in earlier periods, the successful motions 
often involved many affected states joining one amicus brief 
(particularly if there was not a group of states supporting the other side 
as amici).239 States, even those represented by sophisticated state SGs, 
do not garner nearly the same respect as the OSG.240 This suggests that 
the SG’s special place at the Court is not driven solely by comity to 
another branch of government. Other practices at the Court, such as 
the restrictive standards imposed for legislative standing,241 reinforce 
this conclusion. 
The Court’s modern treatment of non-OSG amici is consistent 
with the widespread impression among Supreme Court litigators that 
these litigants are permitted to appear at oral argument only if they 
offer unique legal arguments or represent institutional interests.242 
With respect to these amici, the Court takes seriously its stated 
requirement that an amicus’s argument “provide assistance to the 
Court not otherwise available.”243 For private amici, the Court  
enforces its warning that motions for amicus oral argument,  
without permission of the parties, are “granted only in the most  
extraordinary circumstances.”244 
 
 237. See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1543 (2018) (mem.) 
(Carter Phillips for Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China); Spector v. Norwegian 
Cruise Line Ltd., 543 U.S. 1135 (2005) (mem.) (Gregory G. Garre for the Commonwealth of the 
Bahamas and the Bahamas Maritime Authority); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 541 
U.S. 901 (2004) (mem.) (Carter Phillips for Commission of the European Communities). 
 238. Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 555 U.S. 807 (2008) (mem.). 
 239. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 549 U.S. 1263 (2007) (mem.) 
(thirty-seven states); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 1293 (2008) (mem.) (nine states). 
 240. See Dan Schweitzer, The Modern History of State Attorneys Arguing as Amici Curiae in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 22 GREEN BAG 2D 143, 146–50 (2019) (listing denials of amicus oral 
argument motions by states, including where counsel of record are state solicitors general Kevin 
Newsom, Ted Cruz, and Jeffrey Sutton). 
 241. See David J. Weiner, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 205 (2001). 
 242. Interview with Erin Murphy (Apr. 2019) (discussing her experience representing states 
and noting “I think the Court is generally more receptive to hearing from an institutional party 
and thinking about institutional interests as something that can be distinct from the parties to the 
case”); Interview with Carter Phillips (Apr. 2019) (discussing how his representation of the 
European Commission and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce as amici “were worth the Court’s 
time because we really had a different perspective and point to make”). 
 243. SUP. CT. R. 37.2(b), 28.7. 
 244. Id. 28.7. 
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The percentage of cases in which the OSG requests amicus oral 
argument has continued to rise. Today, the OSG files such motions in 
between one-third and slightly over one-half of the Court’s cases,245 
which is almost every case in which it files an amicus brief.246  
Several former members of the OSG attribute this trend, in part, 
to the Court’s shrinking docket and the SG’s desire to give each of the 
OSG’s twenty-something lawyers argument time.247 But that explains 
only so much. The SG has significant control over the number of cases 
in which the OSG represents a party, and SGs have chosen to petition 
the Court for certiorari at lower rates in recent decades.248 If argument 
time was the driving factor, moreover, the SG could enter plenty more 
cases as amicus, but he declines to do so. And even if this theory did 
explain the SG’s behavior, it fails to shed light on why the Court would 
indulge such a practice. 
The rates at which the Court grants the OSG’s motions for 
amicus oral argument have entirely recovered to their pre-1970 
levels.249 Before 2000, the Court continued to deny one or two of the 
OSG’s motions most Terms. From 2011 through April 2020, however, it 
granted all of them. When we asked Supreme Court practitioners what 
might explain this perfect grant rate, multiple people told us a similar 
story, apparently handed down within the OSG, about a case where the 
Court denied a motion for amicus oral argument by the OSG and later 
regretted it.250 
That case was Rehberg v. Paulk, which concerned civil immunity 
from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for grand jury witnesses.251 The OSG, 
led by then-SG Donald B. Verrilli Jr., filed a brief agreeing with 
Respondent that grand jury witnesses are immune from civil damages 
based on their testimony. It added, however, that grand jury witnesses 
could be liable for other conduct, including instigating a malicious 
prosecution.252 The brief also argued that the Court should vacate and 
 
 245. See supra Figure 8. 
 246. Id. The rare cases where the OSG filed an amicus brief but did not seek oral argument 
are largely cases where the amicus brief is filed and argument is not set, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 
556 U.S. 778 (2009). 
 247. Interview with Garre, supra note 85; Interview with Phillips, supra note 242; Interview 
with Former Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85; Interview with Paul D. Clement (May 2019). 
 248. See Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 595, 597–98 (1986); Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1341–42. 
 249. See supra Figure 6. 
 250. See Interview with Sarah Harrington (May 2019); see also Interview with Senior OSG 
Attorney, supra note 85; Interview with Former Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85. 
 251. 566 U.S. 356 (2011). 
 252. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand at 19, 
Rehberg, 566 U.S. 356 (No. 10-788). 
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remand the case even if it sided with Respondent because the lower 
courts had not evaluated Petitioner’s claim that there was evidence of 
nontestimonial misconduct.253 The Court denied the OSG’s amicus oral 
argument motion. At oral argument, the Justices questioned 
Respondent’s counsel at length about the OSG’s position.254 The Court 
ultimately unanimously affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding and did 
not address the OSG’s rationale for vacatur and remand.255  
For nine years after Rehberg, the Court granted every single 
OSG request for amicus oral argument. But in April 2020, the Court 
suddenly denied one of then-SG Francisco’s motions256 following media 
coverage of the SG’s extraordinary streak.257 It is too soon to tell 
whether this is the beginning of a trend or merely an aberration. 
 
*        *        * 
 
The OSG’s amicus oral argument practice started out narrow 
and focused on cases that presented a strong and clear federal interest. 
Beginning in the 1940s, however, the OSG expanded the size and 
subject area of its practice. The Court granted every one of these 
motions until 1958, and its denials remained few and far between 
throughout the 1970s. These denials picked up under SGs Lee and 
Fried, peaking at a 28% denial rate in the 1987 Term. Most came in 
cases where the Court believed that the federal interest was tenuous or 
that hearing from the OSG would be unhelpful—either because its 
interest was no different than that of the party it supported or because 
its position was articulated sufficiently enough for the Court in its brief. 
After Fried left office, the Court returned to granting almost all the 
OSG’s amicus oral argument motions, seemingly without regard to any 
of these factors. Today, the OSG continues to file these motions in 






 253. Id. at 29–31. 
 254. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, 29, 30, 34, Rehberg, 566 U.S. 356 (No. 10-788). 
 255. Rehberg, 566 U.S. 356. 
 256. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 140 S. Ct. 2665 (2020) (mem.). 
 257. See Adam Liptak, The Supreme Court Has a Special ‘Friend’: The Justice Department, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/us/supreme-court-solicitor-
general-amicus.html [https://perma.cc/NN6E-JMD9]. 
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III. JUSTIFYING THE OSG’S OUTSIZED AMICUS  
ORAL ARGUMENT PARTICIPATION 
Although the Court has strongly stated its dislike of divided 
argument, our data show that the Court nearly always permits the OSG 
to participate in oral argument as amicus. In our conversations with 
Supreme Court litigators, including current and former members of the 
OSG, we consistently heard three explanations for this pattern. The 
first is technical: OSG lawyers are highly skilled advocates who are 
experts in Supreme Court litigation. The second is substantive: the 
OSG is the only litigant who can communicate with all the federal 
agencies and convey relevant factual information to the Court. The final 
is normative: the SG is the so-called “Tenth Justice.” As articulated in 
Lincoln Caplan’s seminal book on the topic, the SG is unlike any litigant 
in his simultaneous commitment to litigating on behalf of the executive 
branch and helping the Court.258 Although we find historical support 
for these rationales, we argue that developments at the Court and in 
the SG’s practices have made it no longer justifiable to give preference 
to the SG at amicus oral argument on these bases. 
A. The OSG’s Oral Argument Expertise 
The OSG’s litigators gave it a significant advantage at oral 
argument for much of the Supreme Court’s history. The need for 
litigants who are skilled at oral argument became important in the 
early to mid-twentieth century when the Court began aggressively 
questioning litigants at oral argument.259 
In the early 1900s, there was some semblance of a Supreme 
Court bar because the difficulty of travel caused out-of-town private 
litigants to refer Supreme Court cases to the local bar.260 But as travel 
became easier, arguments were spread out across more nongovernment 
advocates, who were less familiar with the Court.261 While a quarter of 
the nongovernment advocates who appeared before the Court in the 
1840 Term argued two or more cases, that number fell to 7% by the 1940 
Term.262 During most of the twentieth century, members of the  
private bar did not appear nearly as regularly before the Court as did  
 
 258. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
 259. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text. 
 260. Shapiro, supra note 103, at 28.  
 261. Lazarus, supra note 69, at 1493 n.30. 
 262. Id. 
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members of the OSG, who continuously honed their oral advocacy in  
this manner.263 
The rise of the Supreme Court bar since the mid-1980s, however, 
has eroded that advantage. In the 1980s, several prominent members 
of the OSG—including former SGs—went to private law firms. The first 
was former SG Lee, who left his position for Sidley Austin in 1985.264 In 
the years that followed, several other OSG lawyers went into private 
practice.265 Today, Supreme Court practices staffed by former members 
of the OSG and other Court experts are a staple of many large law 
firms.266 Some small law firms are dedicated to practicing in appellate 
courts, and in particular the Supreme Court.267 
Nonprofit organizations, law school clinics, and state solicitor 
general offices have also hired experienced and respected Supreme 
Court litigators. Organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,268 
the American Civil Liberties Union, and Public Citizen all have active 
Supreme Court practices,269 as do associational groups like the 
Chamber of Commerce.270 In the last fifteen years, many law schools 
have started successful pro bono Supreme Court clinics led by members 
of the Supreme Court bar.271 Thirty-nine states have a solicitor 
general’s office, and another seven have a similar position under the 
attorney general.272 More than half of state solicitors general attended 
top twenty law schools, almost 40% clerked on federal appellate courts, 
and 18% clerked on the Court.273 
From the 2012 through the 2018 Terms, around 40% of 
advocates who argued before the Court were “expert” litigators— 
defined as either having argued before the Court at least five times or 
being affiliated with a firm or organization with lawyers that, in the 
aggregate, has argued at least ten times before the Court—from outside 
the OSG.274 Because these advocates appear regularly before the Court, 
 
 263. See Tony Mauro, Appealing Practice, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at 14. 
 264. Lazarus, supra note 69, at 1498. 
 265. Id. at 1499–1500. 
 266. Id. at 1500.  
 267. Id. at 1500–01. 
 268. Id. at 1501 n.69. 
 269. Id. at 1501. 
 270. Id. at 1506–07. 
 271. Id. at 1502. 
 272. Anthony Johnstone, Hearing the States, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 575, 601 (2018). 
 273. Greg Goelzhauser & Nicole Vouvalis, State Coordinating Institutions and Agenda Setting 
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 41 AM. POL. RSCH. 819, 823 (2013). 
 274. Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018: Oral Argument – Advocates, SCOTUSBLOG  
(June 28, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/StatPack_OT18-7_8_19-
33-34.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UQ2-BXBG]. 
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they use many of the same credibility-building and -guarding 
techniques as the OSG. Their high success rate in petitioning the Court, 
although not achieved by every expert, suggests they perform a 
“filtering,” or validating, function in the certiorari process that is 
similar to the OSG’s. In 2007, the Court granted more than half of 
petitions made by lawyers who were “experts.”275 
These advocates have also been successful on the merits. 
Between 2013 and 2017, twenty-two groups outside the OSG had at 
least four arguments before the Court and at least a 50% win rate.276 
These included eleven law firms, four state solicitors general, one state 
attorney general, three law school clinics, two nonprofits, and the Office 
of the Federal Public Defenders.277 Six of these groups won three 
quarters or more of their cases.278 
Experienced Supreme Court advocates outside the OSG now 
appear frequently before the Court. These non-OSG experts increase 
the quality of oral argument while diminishing the Court’s need to hear 
from the OSG.  
B. The OSG’s Access to Federal Agencies 
The OSG’s ability to gather information from federal agencies 
and relay it to the Court was also a key advantage for most of the 
twentieth century. Beginning in the 1940s, a large amount of litigation 
centered on the legality of agency action.279 Answering these questions 
implicated formal or informal deference to the agency—which required 
understanding the agency’s reasoning and position—as well as policy 
and pragmatic concerns regarding the functioning of the federal 
government. The OSG was the only litigant who could provide these 
answers because it alone had access to the agencies.280 
Many Supreme Court litigators, including current and former 
members of the OSG, told us that the office’s access to agencies gives it 
 
 275. Lazarus, supra note 69, at 1502, 1516; Adam Feldman & Alexander Kappner, Finding 
Certainty in Cert: An Empirical Analysis of the Factors Involved in Supreme Court Certiorari 
Decisions from 2001-2015, 61 VILL. L. REV. 795, 821 fig.11 (2016) (showing that from 2012 to 2015, 
the nine non-OSG lawyers who filed the most certiorari petitions had between 20%–50% granted). 
 276. Adam Feldman, Supreme Court All-Stars 2013-2017, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://empiricalscotus.com/supreme-court-all-stars-2013-2017 [https://perma.cc/ES3G-7WNF]. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. See supra Section II.B.2. 
 280. Even when the SG declines to defend an agency’s position, as in Smith v. Berryhill, 139 
S. Ct. 1765 (2019), the agency may be prohibited from assisting a court-appointed amicus in 
defending its own actions. See Interview with Deepak Gupta (Apr. 2019). Gupta was the Court-
appointed amicus in Berryhill. 
             
726 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3:681 
 
an advantage over other litigants.281 In practice, however, the OSG 
rarely cites nonpublic facts gathered from agencies. In our review of the 
OSG’s amicus briefs, we found that the office almost never cited to facts 
about the government that were not publicly available. In the 2017 
Term, for example, only one of the OSG’s twenty-one amicus briefs did 
so.282 Most arguments made by the OSG in amicus briefs are legal 
rather than factual. The low volume of federal legislation creating new 
agencies or giving new responsibilities to existing ones also reduces the 
volume of litigation to which agency information is relevant.283 
The OSG also has an unfortunate recent history of offering 
inaccurate factual information about the federal government. Law 
professor Nancy Morawetz has documented how, in Nken v. Holder,284 
the OSG misrepresented one of the core issues: whether the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) had a policy to return 
persons if they won their deportation case in court.285 After the case was 
argued, Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) litigation showed that the 
OSG “buried” DHS’s lack of such a policy.286 The OSG wrote to the Court 
to “clarify and correct” its prior statement—several years after the 
Court issued its decision.287 
In Clapper v. Amnesty International,288 which involved a 
constitutional challenge to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
standing was a central issue. At oral argument, then-SG Verrilli told 
the Court that the government had a practice of giving notice to 
criminal defendants when warrantless surveillance was the source of 
evidence against them, and thus those individuals would have standing 
 
 281. Interview with Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85 (“We can be a repository of 
information about the federal agencies, and the Court counts on us to go out there and get it. The 
Court cannot get that information anywhere else.”); Interview with Garre, supra note 85; 
Interview with Kannon Shanmugam (Apr. 2019); Interview with Clement, supra note 247. 
 282. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 31, Jesner v. 
Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (No. 16-499). The SG’s brief in Husted v. A. Philip 
Randolph Institute, 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018), arguably also contained new information, but this new 
information reflected the DOJ’s decision to change its position on whether the type of voter roll 
maintenance system used by Ohio was legally permissible. Brief of the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, Husted, 138 S. Ct. 1833 (No. 16-980). 
 283. Paul Clement has suggested that the low volume of federal legislation has contributed to 
the reduction in SG certiorari petitions in the last two decades. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 
3, at 1350 n.137. 
 284. 556 U.S. 418 (2009).  
 285. Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts: Nken v. Holder, the Solicitor General, and the 
Presentation of Internal Government Facts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (2013). 
 286. Id. at 1641.  
 287. Letter from Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solic. Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to William K. 
Suter, Clerk, Sup. Ct. of the U.S. 1 (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/ 
346755-nken-v-holder-letter.html [https://perma.cc/32R8-TJZU]. 
 288. 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
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to challenge the law. But he said that the reporters, lawyers, and 
human rights groups that wanted to challenge the law lacked standing 
because they could not show they had been harmed by the surveillance 
program—and they had no reason to think their communications were 
being collected.289 The majority opinion parroted this point.290 The DOJ, 
however, had no such policy for giving notice.291 Verrilli had apparently 
been unaware that he misled the Court. He later convinced the DOJ to 
change its procedures to give such notice.292 
More recently, in Department of Commerce v. New York,293 a case 
about whether the Secretary of Commerce could add a citizenship 
question to the 2020 census, a majority of the Court concluded that SG 
Francisco’s representations to the Court were demonstrably false. The 
Secretary and the SG claimed that the citizenship question was 
necessary to better enforce the Voting Rights Act and that the Justice 
Department had requested that the Commerce Department add the 
question.294 Yet the record revealed that the Secretary decided on his 
own to add the question and that his policy director shopped around for 
an agency that would request citizenship data.295 The majority 
concluded that the SG presented “an explanation for agency action that 
is incongruent with what the record reveals about the agency’s 
priorities and decisionmaking process.”296  
The fact that the OSG represented a party rather than an 
amicus in these cases might account for what Morawetz criticizes as 
“the work of an advocate.”297 But if—as the Tenth Justice concept 
assumes—the OSG is motivated to jealously guard its credibility 
because it is a repeat player, there should be minimal differences in how 
it approaches party versus amicus cases. The problem with the OSG’s 
use of facts is that, in most cases, they cannot be verified.298 The claim 
is not that the OSG acts in bad faith; rather, it is that the appellate 
process is not designed for fact-finding and therefore the OSG’s ability 
 
 289. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–8, Clapper, 568 U.S. 398 (No. 11-1025). 
 290. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 421–22. 
 291. Sandra L. Lynch, Constitutional Integrity: Lessons from the Shadows, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
623, 626 & n.19 (2017). 
 292. Charlie Savage, Door May Open for Challenge to Secret Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES  
(Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/us/politics/us-legal-shift-may-open-door-for-
challenge-to-secret-wiretaps.html [https://perma.cc/R76W-WRZW]. 
 293. 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019). 
 294. Id. at 2562. 
 295. Id. at 2575. 
 296. Id.  
 297. Morawetz, supra note 285, at 1654. 
 298. Id. at 1654–55. 
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to offer these facts is not necessarily valuable to the Court’s 
decisionmaking process. 
Some of this fact-finding may also be conducted by lawyers 
outside the OSG. Since the 1960s and 1970s, agencies increasingly 
conduct their work in public,299 and federal statutes like FOIA300 have 
created affirmative disclosure requirements for agencies. Scholarship 
has shown how the rise of citations to legislative history in the first half 
of the twentieth century was dominated by government lawyers, in part 
because they had access to better resources.301 Today, a combination of 
greater litigation around agencies coupled with growth in legal research 
technology has diminished the government’s historical advantage—
though admittedly has not eliminated it.302 
Some of the most influential briefs that offered information 
gathered from government officials were not authored by the OSG. In 
the 2003 affirmative action case Grutter v. Bollinger,303 one of the 
arguments the Court found most persuasive came from an amicus brief 
on behalf of retired military officials. Counsel of record Carter Phillips 
argued that affirmative action was a national security issue and that 
the military required officers trained in diverse environments.304 The 
brief was repeatedly cited at oral argument.305 As a measure of the 
brief’s influence, when the Court considered another constitutional 
challenge to affirmative action thirteen years later, the OSG cosigned a 
brief with the Department of Defense,306 and SG Verrilli proactively 
brought up the point at oral argument.307 
 
 299. See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE RISE OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW: POLITICS AND THE CULTURE 
OF TRANSPARENCY, 1945-1975 (2015). 
 300. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2); see also Agency Practices and Procedures for the Indexing and Public 
Availability of Adjudicatory Decisions, 54 Fed. Reg. 53, 493, 53, 495 (Dec. 29, 1989) (to be codified 
at 1 C.F.R. pts. 305, 310) (providing guidance for agencies’ public disclosures and indexing, as 
required under the FOIA).  
 301. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the 
Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 281 (2013). 
 302. Id. at 390 n.446. 
 303. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 304. Brief of Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton et al. as Amici Curiae, Grutter, 539 U.S. 
306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516). The OSG also filed an amicus brief in the case but did not mention any 
military interest. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Grutter, 539 
U.S. 306 (No. 02-241). 
 305. Larsen & Devins, supra note 20, at 1905. 
 306. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Fisher v. Univ. of 
Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
 307. Transcript of Oral Argument at 87, Fisher, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981). 
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Finally, several Justices have recently expressed skepticism 
about judicial deference to administrative agencies in litigation.308 If 
agencies’ own policy and interpretive statements are not worthy of 
deference, agency operations, as synthesized through the OSG, should 
not be held in any particular esteem. 
C. The SG as the Tenth Justice 
The conception of the SG as the “Tenth Justice” stems from a 
long history of OSG practice. It is not clear when the moniker 
originated, but it has been core to the perception of the OSG at least 
since the 1930s.309 The concept is rooted in the OSG’s service to at least 
two, and sometimes three, branches of the government: to the executive, 
by soliciting and presenting its views; sometimes to the legislative, by 
defending federal statutes; and to the judicial, by presenting the 
arguments and viewpoints that allow for the best development of 
American law. Because the OSG is the quintessential repeat player at 
the Court, it best fulfills its role (as the representative of the executive 
branch) by maximizing its credibility before its audience (the Court).310 
This role is reinforced by the norm of the SG’s “independence,” a shield 
from the political pressures on the AG and other parts of the DOJ in all 
but the most controversial of cases.311 
The SG’s ability to serve as the Tenth Justice is possible only 
because of a professional anomaly: the SG, unlike virtually every other 
lawyer, does not have a readily identifiable client to whom he owes legal 
duties. Under the standard ethical rules, attorneys are bound to 
consider only what is in the interest of a given client and not how a 
matter will affect other clients or even the development of the law.312 
They cannot inform the Court that the court below erred in ruling for 
their clients.  
 
 308. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) 
(arguing that current deferential precedent be overturned, which would allow courts to decide 
cases based on their own independent judgment). 
 309. See Stern, supra note 116, at 155 (quoting Judge Thacher speaking as SG in 1931 as 
saying, “This duty brings with it a peculiar responsibility to the Court, in taking infinite pains to 
see that the cases presented are only such as are worthy of its review” and asserting that “[t]he 
Solicitor General regards himself—and the Supreme Court regards him—not only as an officer of 
the Executive Branch but also as an officer of the Court”). 
 310. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1337. 
 311. See CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 17–18 (“[I]t has been important for the SG to be 
‘independent’ in order to fulfill his duty to both the Executive Branch and the Supreme Court.”). 
 312. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer 
must . . . act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in 
advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”). 
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Because the OSG is unconstrained by these ethical 
requirements, it can serve partly as an advocate for its client and 
otherwise as an aid to the Court.313 As a result, the OSG is expected to 
maintain higher litigation standards than those of attorneys for private 
litigants. The Tenth Justice does not present legal arguments to the 
Court unless he finds them credible and believes the Court will also. 
Every primary function associated with the Tenth Justice is 
premised on this unique ethical status. One of the OSG’s most 
important roles is shaping the Court’s docket by deciding whether to 
petition for certiorari and, if so, what position to take.314 SGs have 
described this choice as motivated by an effort to meet the Court’s 
expectations.315 Based on the OSG’s grant rate compared to those of 
other litigants, the Court seems to value this filtering.316 
The OSG also filters through the potentially discordant views 
within the federal government to present only one to the Court.317 In a 
series of cases from 1866 to 1888, the Court held that the AG had 
plenary power over all litigation conducted on behalf of the federal 
government unless that authority was statutorily placed elsewhere.318 
No federal court would hear from a representative of another 
department of the federal government if the AG or his representative 
(the SG) already represented the United States in the litigation.319 
When Congress later created administrative agencies, Congress 
followed the courts’ lead and generally vested agencies’ litigation 
 
 313. See Francis J. Aul, Note, Out of Many Clients, One: Conflict of Interest and the Office of 
the Solicitor General, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475 (2018). 
 314. Erwin N. Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General—Representing the Interests of the 
United States Before the Supreme Court, 34 MO. L. REV. 527, 532 (1969); Stern, supra note 116, at 
155; Lee, supra note 248, at 598.  
 315. Stern, supra note 116, at 156 (“The selfish reason for the Solicitor General’s self-restraint 
in petitioning for certiorari is to give the Court confidence in Government petitions.”); Lee, supra 
note 248, at 598–99. 
 316. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1333 (noting that Court grants approximately 
70% of the OSG’s petitions for certiorari); Examining the Operation and Activities of the Office of 
the Solicitor General of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
supra note 174, at 4 (“[T]he Supreme Court has stated: This Court relies on the Solicitor General 
to exercise such independent judgment and to decline to authorize petitions for review in this Court 
in the majority of cases the Government has lost in the courts of appeals.”). Former SG Rex Lee 
speculated that the Court has a “decisional capacity” for the federal government such that if the 
SG petitioned for certiorari more frequently, the Court would grant a smaller percentage of its 
petitions. Lee, supra note 248, at 598. 
 317. Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Solicitor General and His Client, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 337, 340–
41 (1981). 
 318. See Sewall Key, The Legal Work of the Federal Government, 25 VA. L. REV. 165, 185– 
87 (1938). 
 319. Id. at 185. 
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authority in the DOJ.320 The Court has emphasized the importance of 
hearing only “one voice” from the federal government—a voice, the 
Court clarified, “that reflects not the parochial interests of a particular 
agency, but the common interests of the Government and therefore of 
all the people.”321  
The OSG attempts to consider how every case may impact the 
interests of the different parts of the executive branch. To do so, it has 
developed a formal policy of soliciting the views of the agencies any time 
it considers entering a case as amicus. The OSG receives written 
memoranda from agency attorneys articulating their legal positions.322 
The OSG then arranges a meeting with agency representatives and 
each of the litigants to hear the different interests at stake before 
determining its position.323 The tempering of agencies’ narrow interests 
may take many forms, including a compromise position between those 
of two agencies, a toning down of an agency’s view, or a refusal to 
present an agency’s view to the Court.324  
It is only because the OSG has no “client” that the Court can 
require it to perform this function, which is considered an essential part 
of the Tenth Justice role.325 Many former SGs have agonized about the 
predictable conflicts that arise between agencies, which must be settled 
out of the view of the Court and which the SG has unilateral authority 
to adjudicate.326 There is no indication the Court shares these concerns. 
One of the most prominently proclaimed ways in which this 
function manifests itself is that the SG sometimes “confesses error,” or 
 
 320. See James R. Harvey III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of Justice 
Representation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1575 (1996) (noting that the SG’s 
office is “much less encumbered by the restrictions on litigating authority and loyalty toward an 
agency” than the DOJ generally and that fewer than ten out of forty-one agencies can 
independently litigate before the Court). 
 321. United States v. Providence J. Co., 485 U.S. 693, 706 (1988). 
 322. Interview with Former Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85. 
 323. Interview with Joshua Rosenkranz (Apr. 2019); Interview with Clement, supra note 247. 
 324. Interview with Harrington, supra note 250; Interview with Senior OSG Attorney, supra 
note 85; Interview with Former Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85; Interview with Waxman, 
supra note 81. 
 325. Stern, supra note 116, at 155. 
 326. Id. at 217; Theodore B. Olson, Lecture, The Advocate as Friend: The Solicitor General’s 
Stewardship Through the Example of Rex E. Lee, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1, 12–13 (“[T]he startling 
consequence of my making a decision in these circumstances is that the side that I rule against 
doesn’t get represented at all.” (quoting Rex E. Lee)); Symposium, Bush Panel, 2003 BYU L. REV. 
62, 73 (“I have always been a little surprised at the prominence of the office in resolving those 
types of decisions.” (quoting John G. Roberts)); Interview with Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 
85 (explaining that the OSG often gives greater weight to the lead agency, the soundness of legal 
arguments, and spillover effects while remarking that “[t]here is no formula, and that is what 
makes mediating conflicts between the different agencies one of the most interesting parts of  
the job”). 
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contends that the lower court erred in siding with him.327 Estimates 
suggest this happens two to three times per year.328 Scholars329 and 
members of the OSG330 tout this as strong evidence of Tenth Justice-
like behavior—although others have viewed it as little more than 
partisan politics.331 Confessing error, absent permission from the client, 
would be flatly unethical for an attorney representing a private party.332 
Because the SG does not have a “client” in the traditional sense of the 
word, he is not bound by this rule. 
The most central aspect of the Tenth Justice tradition is the 
notion that the SG is apolitical, or at least rarely political. This same 
neutrality is not demanded of other litigants, who are expected and 
required to advocate for the positions of their clients, political or 
otherwise. When the OSG litigates on behalf of the “interests of the 
United States”—as determined by the SG in his discretion—the OSG 
may represent one of two conceivable interests: the institutional 
interests of the United States, which should be relatively constant over 
time, or the president’s interests, which shift across administrations. 
Although the OSG has long proclaimed its independence from 
politics, the basis of this claim is questionable. The SG (and, after 1982, 
the Principal Deputy as well333) is a political appointee who works under 
 
 327. See Drew S. Days III, Lecture, In Search of the Solicitor General’s Clients: A Drama with 
Many Characters, 83 KY. L.J. 485, 487–88 (1994) (quoting REBECCA M. SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR 
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as political decisions, as was the Obama Administration’s refusal to defend the Defense of 
Marriage Act. See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Shift, U.S. Says Marriage Act 
Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/us/ 
24marriage.html [https://perma.cc/6T3L-G4VC]. As Judge Learned Hand said, “It’s bad enough to 
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General.” Archibald Cox, The Government in the Supreme Court, 44 CHI. BAR REC. 221, 224–25 
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Neal Katyal “confessed error” in Korematsu—more than half a century after it was decided. See 
Katyal, supra note 328, at 3029.  
 332. See supra note 312 and accompanying text (considering ethical rules). 
 333. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 62. 
             
2021] THE LOUDEST VOICE AT THE SUPREME COURT 733 
 
another political appointee, the AG.334 The president and the AG can 
fire the SG without cause.335 And the president need not have direct 
discussions with the SG to influence him. Presidents often make public 
statements about their policy aspirations, and an SG who wanted to 
serve the president’s wishes could use those as cues. 
Dating back at least to the tenure of SG Philip Perlman 
(appointed by President Truman), the SG has had conversations with 
the AG and the president about the position the OSG would take in 
highly political cases.336 In Brown, the OSG effectively transferred 
control of its amicus brief to the AG’s office.337  
Communication between the OSG and the president’s office 
makes sense from a structural perspective. If the OSG is to represent 
the views of the federal government, and more narrowly the executive 
branch, the president will unquestionably shape those views. Many 
former SGs stated openly that they believed they had a duty to serve 
the president’s interests.338 
At different points in the OSG’s history, politicization was a 
primary concern of Court watchers and some Justices.339 That occurred 
most notably during the Reagan Administration. Reagan had run for 
president on an explicit agenda to rein in the excesses of the activist 
Warren Court.340 Observers worried that he would pressure the Court 
and the SG to adopt positions out of political ideology rather than  
legal principle.341 
A memorandum published by the Office of Legal Counsel in 1977 
seeking to define the proper relationship between the SG and the White 
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 335. See REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 70 (1994) 
(“[The SG] serve[s] at the pleasure of the president.”). 
 336. See supra notes 146-153 and accompanying text (explaining the Truman White House’s 
involvement in the decision to participate in Shelley v. Kramer and in drafting of government’s 
brief); see also Days, supra note 327, at 493 (“[G]iven the way that the decision-making process 
works, by the time a case has reached the point of possible appellate court or Supreme Court 
review, the policy concerns of the President have usually been fully presented to the Solicitor 
General by his appointees in the affected departments and agencies.”). 
 337. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 28–32. 
 338. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 248, at 599 (describing the practice of requesting certiorari in 
cases that “fall right at the core of the current administration’s broader agenda”); Symposium, 
Panel of Former Solicitors General, 2003 BYU L. REV. 153, 155–59 (Starr, Dellinger, and Days 
discussing various levels of cooperation with and deference towards White House lawyers). 
 339. See generally CAPLAN, supra note 6 (documenting the SG’s usual independence from the 
president and reasons to believe that policy changed during the Reagan Administration, and in 
particular during Charles Fried’s tenure). 
 340. Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith & Antonio Tomarchio, The Reagan Revolution in the 
Network of Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1228 (2008). 
 341. See CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 270. 
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House explained the tradition of “independence” as a means of ensuring 
that the OSG made legal decisions unclouded by political 
considerations: “If the independent legal advice of the Solicitor General 
is to be preserved, it should normally be the Solicitor General who 
decides when to seek the advice of the Attorney General or the 
President in a given case.”342 A criticism of SG Fried was premised on 
this view. Caplan argued that a group of political appointees in the 
Justice Department, supported by the Reagan White House, put 
extraordinary pressure on SGs Lee and Fried. Lee largely resisted the 
pressure, saying when he resigned: “There has been this notion that my 
job is to press the Administration’s policies at every turn and announce 
true conservative principles through the pages of my briefs. It is not. 
I’m the Solicitor General, not the Pamphleteer General.”343 Caplan 
argued that Fried allowed politics to guide him so strongly in some cases 
that it overrode his utility to the Court, by compromising either his 
judgment about what constituted an acceptable legal argument or his 
commitment to making one.344 
Reflecting on his tenure, now-Professor Fried disagreed with 
even the premise of the Tenth Justice: 
The idea of the SG as a “Tenth Justice” who does not have opinions about what the law 
should be is odd. It’s not like the first nine don’t have points of view. As long as the SG 
presents an objective and complete view of precedent and the record, he may ask the Court 
to develop the law to be consistent with his point of view.345 
We do not challenge the Tenth Justice concept, nor do we argue that the 
SG’s capacity to conform to it has eroded. Instead, our claim is  
that he has strayed from this role over time with the Court’s  
effective permission.  
Historically, the Court appeared sensitive to the distinction 
between the long-term federal interest and the president’s interests: it 
rejected some of the SG’s requests to participate in amicus oral 
argument when the federal interest was minimal.346 But from 2011 
until April 2020, the Court rejected none of these requests.347 The mere 
fact of granting oral argument does not imply that the Court necessarily 
agrees with the OSG’s position, and the Court has listened to SGs 
 
 342. JOHN M. HARMON, OFF. OF LEGAL COUNS., 77-56 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL: ROLE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 235 (1977), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/21201/download [https://perma.cc/5X39-8PTA]. 
 343. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 107. 
 344. Id. at 235–48 (documenting instances in which Fried’s positions during the 1985 Term 
appeared to be grounded in political considerations at the expense of strong legal reasoning). 
 345. Interview with Fried, supra note 85.  
 346. See supra notes 209-231 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra Figure 6 (illustrating the grant rate of SG requests). 
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appointed by both Republicans and Democrats. But the Justices’ nearly 
unlimited willingness to hear from the OSG nonetheless suggests they 
welcome the OSG’s participation in all the cases in which it has 
expressed an interest, seemingly without reference to its motives. 
Current and former members of the OSG told us that political 
cases were only a small part of the office’s workload. This assessment 
appears largely correct: most of the cases the OSG enters as amicus 
involve questions of agency administration or regulation.348 But even 
those cases may have political overtones,349 and the minority of cases 
that are politically charged are the most visible and thus shape the 
OSG’s reputation.350 As a sign of their importance, these cases are often 
argued by the SG or the Principal Deputy SG. 
Despite evidence of the SG’s political motivations in some cases, 
the Court’s behavior suggests it believes to a large extent in the Tenth 
Justice conception of the SG. Unlike its treatment of any other litigant, 
the Court has relied on, and even shaped, the OSG throughout history.  
The strongest indication of the Court’s reliance on the OSG is its 
issuance of CVSG orders.351 Why this practice developed is unclear, but 
it suggests that the Court valued the OSG’s judgment even though—or 
perhaps because—it lacked an identifiable client.352 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated openly that he gave the OSG’s petitions for certiorari 
the “benefit of the doubt.”353 
The Court has also continuously shaped the OSG’s behavior. In 
1949, the Court for the first time required that all nongovernmental 
parties who wanted to file an amicus brief either obtain the consent of 
the parties or else file a motion describing the applicant’s interest and 
how it offered an argument not adequately covered by the parties.354 
Following the rule change, the OSG flipped from almost always giving 
 
 348. See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing the most common governmental interests asserted in 
amicus briefs).   
 349. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (upholding Auer deference, a  
doctrine with political implications for implementation of the president’s agenda through 
administrative agencies). 
 350. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013). 
 351. Solimine, supra note 70, at 1186; Lepore, supra note 58, at 36. 
 352. Cf., e.g., Preliminary Memorandum, Solem v. Bartlett (Mar. 18, 1983), in Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr. Papers, Box 107, Supreme Court Case Files Collection 1, 5 (on file with the Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Library), https://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/82-
1253_Solm_Bartlett.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6P3-D8T7] (“I therefore see no way around a grant in 
this case, although it may be worthwhile to call for the views of the Solicitor General to see whether 
he suggests any good way of avoiding plenary review.”). 
 353. CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 266. 
 354. Harper & Etherington, supra note 135, at 1173. 
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consent to almost always refusing it.355 Justice Frankfurter twice 
publicly reprimanded the OSG for this new practice.356 He complained 
that the OSG had improperly shifted the burden of sorting 
applications—properly assigned to it as a party—back onto the Court.357 
When SG Fried advanced legal arguments the Court believed went too 
far, the Court denied his motions for amicus oral argument and even 
chastised him in opinions.358 When they believed he favored politics 
over the quality of legal argument, some Justices went on record and 
told journalist Lincoln Caplan so.359 Chief Justice Rehnquist said he 
began looking at the SG’s certiorari petitions more closely.360 When SG 
Francisco reversed the OSG’s position in several cases, some of the 
Justices questioned him about that at oral argument.361 
While the Court has given the OSG immense power over its 
docket, these targeted directives demonstrate how the Court also seeks 
to shape the OSG into the institution it wants. More concerning, this 
behavior suggests that the Court views these problems of politicization 
and overstepping as one-off and correctable. It indicates that some of 
the Justices believe they can discern when the OSG is acting in a 
manner of which they disapprove. If accurate, this view could justify a 
default view of the SG as the Tenth Justice. The Court’s willingness to 
hear from the OSG at amicus oral argument in virtually any case it 
desires, however, suggests that the Court does not—and perhaps 
cannot—in fact detect when the OSG is motivated purely by politics. 
IV. DECIDING WHO SHOULD BE HEARD 
We have argued that the traditional justifications for giving 
preference to OSG over non-OSG amici for participation in oral 
argument no longer hold. Standing alone, this conclusion does not 
explain who should be given the privilege of amicus oral argument and 
when. This Part aims to fill that gap. We begin by cataloging  
the concerns posed by amicus oral argument: its challenge  
to due process in the adversarial context, its potential to unduly  
 
 355. Krislov, supra note 21, at 714. 
 356. Harper & Etherington, supra note 135, at 1176; Krislov, supra note 21, at 714. 
 357. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 924 (1952) (mem., Frankfurter, J.). 
 358. See supra Section II.B.3 (discussing the period during which Fried served as SG). 
 359. See CAPLAN, supra note 6, at 264–67. 
 360. See id. at 266 (Chief Justice Rehnquist stating that he lost “the feeling that every case is 
presented squarely” in the SG’s certiorari petitions).  
 361. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) 
(No. 16-1466) (“Justice Sotomayor: Mr.—Mr. General, by the way, how many times this term 
already have you flipped positions from prior administrations?”). 
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influence the development of law, and its threats to the Court’s  
institutional legitimacy. 
We start with the observation that all amicus oral argument 
participation—but particularly by the OSG so frequently and to the 
almost complete exclusion of others—creates procedural and 
substantive problems. First, amicus oral argument distorts the 
adversarial process. The due process concerns underpinning the 
American adversarial system presume a contest between two parties, 
each with lawyer who advocates zealously on their behalf.362 Unlike 
most amici, the parties will be directly impacted by the Court’s decision 
regardless of how narrowly it rules and on what grounds.  
In many cases, amicus oral argument displaces the parties’ 
rights as litigants. Divided argument is, as Justice (and former SG) 
Robert Jackson put it, “at best . . . somewhat overlapping, repetitious 
and incomplete and, at worst, contradictory, inconsistent and 
confusing.”363 He offered a blanket rule for litigators: “Never divide 
between two or more counsel the argument on behalf of a single 
interest.”364 At the Supreme Court, amici generally take argument time 
away from the party they support.365 Granting amicus oral argument 
requests therefore has the effect of depriving the lawyer representing 
that party of time she could use to advocate for her client.  
In addition, amici are encouraged to offer legal arguments not 
advanced by the parties.366 They may thus undermine or even derail a 
party’s arguments. The lawyer for the party the amicus supports may 
even have to spend some of her newly diminished time distinguishing 
the amicus’s arguments. Even when an amicus adopts the same legal 
reasoning as the party it supports, his participation undermines the due 
process rights of the opposing party (who lacks the opportunity to have 
a second voice buttress its arguments). In some categories of cases, 
especially criminal cases, the OSG’s support is only reasonably 
available to one party.367 
Private litigants seldom oppose the SG’s motions for amicus oral 
argument and often solicit them when the SG might be on their side. 
Several Supreme Court litigators told us they almost never, or had 
 
 362. Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 
DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (2011). 
 363. Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case 
Presentations, 37 A.B.A. J. 801, 802 (1951). 
 364. Id. at 801-02.  
 365. See SUP. CT. R. 28.7 (stating that, in the absence of a party’s consent to share time, an 
amicus oral argument motion “will be granted only in the most extraordinary circumstances”). 
 366. Id. 37.1. 
 367. See infra text accompanying note 430. 
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never, supported amicus oral argument by even other elite Supreme 
Court practitioners outside the OSG.368 This suggests that parties may 
want the OSG on their side because they believe the Court weighs 
arguments more heavily when they are advanced by the OSG—not 
because the OSG attorney would more skillfully use the ten minutes of 
oral argument than they would. Another possible explanation is that 
these litigators do not want to appear to rebuke the OSG because of its 
influence over the Court and its repeat player status. 
Amicus oral argument may also affect the substantive 
development of the law. One of the most frequently cited rationales for 
permitting amicus oral argument is that the amicus may help the Court 
reach the correct legal rule in a given case. Some instances in which the 
Court has granted amicus oral argument appear clearly to be motivated 
by this thought—particularly when the amici supported neither 
party.369 The shift in the OSG’s caseload at the Court from participating 
primarily as a party to appearing more frequently as an amicus 
suggests that the SG believes the OSG can affect substantive outcomes 
as an amicus.370 In some cases, its impact is clear.371 
The fact that it is the OSG who dominates amicus oral argument 
is particularly significant because of the SG’s Tenth Justice reputation. 
As discussed above, the Court defers to the SG in many areas and likely 
believes he fulfills that role. Some of the OSG’s amicus positions, 
however, do not warrant this confidence. But social science research 
suggests that it is difficult for decisionmakers to accurately discount 
information, and particularly that from an otherwise reputable actor.372 
If the Justices are unable to distinguish between when the OSG’s 
judgment—and even citation of new factual information—is deserving 
 
 368. Interview with Rosenkranz, supra note 323; Interview with Murphy, supra note 242; 
Interview with Verrilli, supra note 85.  
 369. See, e.g., Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 576 (2018) (mem.) (granting amicus oral 
argument by Professor Aditya Bamzai, whose brief, in support of neither party, argued that the 
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case). 
 370. Cf. Linda Greenhouse, An Old Supreme Court Dream, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/opinion/supreme-court-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/ 
DB8J-9GP5] (describing a memorandum that then-Special Assistant to the AG John Roberts wrote 
to the AG that lamented the SG’s failure to enter Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), and noted that 
a brief by OSG “could well have . . . altered the outcome”).  
 371. See, e.g., Megan McCracken, Legally Indefensible: Requiring Death Row Prisoners to 
Prove Available Execution Alternatives, 41 CHAMPION 46, 47-48 (2017) (discussing how OSG’s 
amicus position in Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006), influenced the legal standard adopted 
in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008)). 
 372. Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: HUM. 
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 349, 349 (1977); Chanthika Pornpitakpan, The Persuasiveness of 
Source Credibility: A Critical Review of Five Decades’ Evidence, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 243, 
244 (2004). 
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of deference and when it is not, their decisions may give undue weight 
to the OSG’s views. 
Outside of the procedural and substantive problems posed by 
amicus oral argument, the Court’s indulgence of the OSG as an amicus 
at oral argument even when it acts politically also challenges the 
Court’s legitimacy.373 Over the last fifty years, the public has come to 
view the Court as a political body.374 One reason for this is its increased 
willingness to hear cases litigated by interest groups and motivated by 
ideology.375 To counter this perception, the Court should avoid favoring 
actors who operate in a political capacity, particularly the federal 
government. If the Court regularly heard from the Republican or 
Democratic Party, Americans would rightly take note of the intrusion 
of politics in an ostensibly nonpolitical proceeding. 
Court watchers may also be concerned about how this could 
affect the development of the law in the cases in which a majority of the 
Court and the SG were appointed by presidents of the same party. In 
these cases, it is not just that the Court listens to a political actor. 
Rather, some of the Justices may benefit from a political actor who 
makes sophisticated legal arguments that advance ideological interests 
while benefiting from a reputation for neutrality and independence.  
Aside from politics, allowing the OSG to argue as an amicus so 
frequently also enables the OSG to amplify its distinctly institutional 
viewpoint—that of the federal government—at the Court. The Justices 
are naturally sympathetic to the executive’s institutional interests, and 
particularly with the government’s ability to function effectively and 
enforce the law.376 The OSG’s perspective is also fundamentally focused 
on federal power, and executive power in particular. At times, it is at 
odds with the views of a majority of one or both houses of Congress.377 
 
 373. See Curry et al., supra note 166, at 241 (discussing political avenues of influence over the 
Court); Barbara L. Graham, Explaining Supreme Court Policymaking in Civil Rights: The 
Influence of the Solicitor General, 1953-2002, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 253, 266 (2003). 
 374. See Richard L. Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 262 
(2019); Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, Political Justice? Perceptions of 
Politicization and Public Preferences Toward the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 76 PUB. OP. 
Q. 105, 112 (2011). Some scholars have even connected this trend directly to the Court’s apparent 
favoritism towards the OSG. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 14-15 (1991) (describing the SG’s “special role” at the Court and 
concluding that it “does not comport with” notions of independence and a judicial system able to 
defy legislative and political majorities). 
 375. Hasen, supra note 374, at 266–71; Carl Hulse, Political Polarization Takes Hold of the 
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/us/politics/ 
political-polarization-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/239Q-QTN8].  
 376. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1338 nn.68–69. 
 377. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (in which the OSG and the United States 
Senate filed briefs and argued as amici on opposite sides). Amicus oral argument motions by 
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This is a bias many of the Justices likely share378 and one that is 
amplified by the OSG’s frequent oral arguments at the Court. 
Given the risks inherent in continuing the Court’s current 
amicus oral argument practice, we suggest a framework for deciding 
which amicus oral argument motions to grant. Although there are many 
conditions under which an amicus’s participation at oral argument is 
unjustified, there are also circumstances in which the value of divided 
argument might outweigh its costs.379  
We recognize that the Court is likely cautious about granting 
amicus oral argument participation. When we asked expert Supreme 
Court litigators why, in their opinion, the Court did not grant more of 
these motions, several told us they believed the Court did not want to 
be in the position of picking and choosing among amici.380 In 
anticipation of this concern, we propose a standard for when amicus 
oral argument motions should be granted and identify its benefits over 
the Court’s current approach in Section A. In Sections B and C, we 
discuss the primary ways this standard would change the Court’s 
current amicus oral argument practice as it relates to OSG and non-
OSG litigants, respectively. 
A. When Amici Should Be Heard 
Oral argument at the Supreme Court must balance dual 
objectives. It must fulfill the due process principles underlying every 
exercise of judicial power in an adversarial system. It also must 
account, however, for its distinct role in “resolv[ing] public policy issues 
of national importance.”381 Given these charges, we suggest the  
Court should allow amici to argue only if they fall into one of two  
narrow categories. 
 
members of Congress are rare, but often, though not always, granted. See, e.g., Coleman v. Ct. of 
Appeals of Md., 565 U.S. 1091 (2011) (denying amicus oral argument motion of Senator Tom 
Harkin and other members of Congress). 
 378. Every current Justice except Justice Kagan was a judge on a U.S. Court of Appeals before 
being nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court. Every Justice other than Justice Barrett has worked 
in the executive branch of the U.S. government. See SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., supra note 9 (providing 
biographical information of the Justices). 
 379. See Solimine, supra note 70, at 1204 (“The dangers of excessive politicization and 
disruption of the adversarial process might . . . attend the filing of any amicus brief by the SG. But 
those costs are tolerable . . . when the SG is asserting a strong and direct federal interest. The 
costs loom larger when the federal interest . . . is attenuated.”). 
 380. Interview with David Frederick (May 2019) (“A proposal that would spark more motions 
for amicus oral argument is not one that is going to be well received by the Justices.”); Interview 
with Verrilli, supra note 85; Interview with Clement, supra note 247. 
 381. Post, supra note 16, at 1273 n.29. 
             
2021] THE LOUDEST VOICE AT THE SUPREME COURT 741 
 
1. Standard 1: An Amicus with a Concrete Interest  
Who Provides New Legal Reasoning 
The first standard has two criteria: an amicus who (1) has a 
concrete interest in the litigation, and (2) provides new reasoning 
(relative to the parties’ presentation) that advances this interest should 
be permitted to participate in oral argument. To have a “concrete 
interest,” an amicus must have some type of preexisting practice that 
would be disrupted by the case at issue and that the amicus seeks to 
defend. This establishes that the amicus would likely be affected by the 
judgment. Merely stating that an amicus has an academic382 or 
philosophical383 interest in the outcome would be insufficient to 
demonstrate a concrete interest. “New reasoning” refers to  
legal analysis (for example, an originalist analysis) not provided by  
the parties.  
Importantly, there is a category of arguments sometimes raised 
for the first time at the Court that this standard excludes: arguments 
principally offering new factual information. Because the Supreme 
Court is not a fact-finding court, new facts should be litigated in the 
trial court, not granted backdoor access through an amicus.384 
By requiring a concrete interest, this procedure protects the U.S. 
adversarial system and parties’ due process rights. The adversarial 
system presumes that every party has a lawyer who will advocate 
zealously on their behalf.385 Granting amicus oral argument requests 
often has the effect of depriving the lawyer representing a party of time 
she could use to advocate for her client. Under our proposed rule, no 
amicus may interfere with a party’s presentation of the case unless the 
amicus demonstrates that it will also be affected by the judgment. 
Requiring that this amicus also present new reasoning balances the 
Court’s policymaking role (in guiding the development of the law for 
many parties) with disruptions of the adversarial paradigm (in which 
each party must only address the opposing party’s arguments). Because 
participation by an amicus who meets these criteria would be 
 
 382. See, e.g., Brief of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party at 1, Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49 (2013) (No. 
12-929) (“[Amicus] teaches and writes about civil procedure and conflict of laws, and he has an 
interest in the sound development of these fields.”). 
 383. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Faith and Action et al. in Support of Petitioners at 1, 
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (No. 03-1693) (“Amici contends the 
progressive withdrawal of God and his moral law from society through government action, 
particularly in our schools, has had an enormously detrimental effect on our culture . . . .”). 
 384. See supra Section III.B. 
 385. See Gorod, supra note 362, at 4 n.9 (describing the adversarial system). 
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permissive rather than as of right, the Court would maintain the 
discretion to deny such a motion on the basis that its new reasoning is 
not helpful to the Justices’ decisionmaking. 
2. Standard 2: An Amicus Who Raises  
an Entirely New Legal Argument 
In a very narrow set of cases, granting a second type of amicus 
oral argument motion might be justified: when the amicus presents an 
entirely new legal argument that the Court should considering in 
adjudicating the case, even if it has no concrete interest in the litigation. 
Amici who fall under this standard include those raising new 
jurisdictional, constitutional, and other claims.386 
Because of the oddity of permitting anyone to raise an issue at 
the highest level of appellate review not litigated below, the Court 
should be very cautious in granting these motions. As the Justices 
frequently remind us, the Supreme Court is “a court of review, not of 
first view.”387 As a result, the Justices should strongly consider two 
other potential responses to an amicus who raises such an issue. The 
first is straightforward: in every such case, the Court should require 
briefing from the parties on the novel argument presented by amicus. 
The second, more extreme response, would be to dismiss the case as 
improvidently granted. This action is entirely at the Court’s discretion, 
and several Justices have stated that the Court should do so only in 
very limited circumstances.388 Firm application of these solutions is 
necessary to ensure that this standard does not simply invite 
arguments to the Court that seek to overrule rather than apply the law 
or that sidetrack cases based on an issue raised only by the amicus. 
This standard serves due process interests by setting a high bar 
for participation at oral argument by amici who will not be affected by 
the ruling. It does so also by ensuring that amicus oral argument 
motions are granted under this standard only very infrequently. By 
requesting briefing from the party, the Court allocates the primary 
responsibility for developing the argument to the parties. Only when 
 
 386. See, e.g., Brief of Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party 
at 2, Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018) (Nos. 16-961, 16-1017, 16-1423) (arguing that 
the Court did not have Article III jurisdiction to hear the case). 
 387. McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790, 1801 (2017) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 
709, 718 n.7 (2005)). 
 388. See Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 
136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1082–95 (1988); see also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 426 n.3 
(1987) (declining to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because “[t]he 
importance of the legal issue makes it appropriate” to address the merits). 
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the Court views the parties’ briefing or oral argument as insufficient 
should it grant the amicus’s oral argument motion. 
 
*        *        * 
 
The Court’s April 2020 denial of the OSG’s amicus oral 
argument motion in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District 
Court is consistent with our proscription. The case concerns state court 
personal jurisdiction. The OSG’s interest statement reveals an interest 
that is tenuous and muddled. The brief first noted the United States’ 
interest in “ensuring that private plaintiffs have access to efficient 
forums” to sue companies, suggesting it supported broader 
jurisdiction.389 But then it stated that the United States “often defends 
federal officials” and seeks to prevent “risks to . . . commerce” posed by 
expansive state court jurisdiction.390 SG Francisco ultimately decided 
to support Ford, though the OSG’s brief does not explain why.  
In the same order, the Court denied a similar motion made on 
behalf of Minnesota, thirty-eight other states, and the District of 
Columbia.391 Although those states had a more concrete interest in the 
litigation than did the OSG, their brief did not advance unique 
reasoning or arguments.392 Thus, this motion also would have been 
denied under our proposed standards. 
B. Application to the OSG 
Under our proposal, the OSG’s amicus oral argument motions 
would likely be granted much less frequently, primarily because the 
threshold for a concrete interest (justifying amicus oral argument 
participation) is intentionally higher than that for an “interest[ ] of the 
United States.” We are concerned only with the narrow question of 
when the OSG should be granted the privilege of being heard as amicus 
at oral argument, but we wish to briefly distinguish between the  
two standards. 
The federal interest has been described by former SG Seth 
Waxman as “elusive” and “difficult to discern.”393 In practice, the OSG 
 
 389. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1–2, Ford Motor 
Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 19-368 (S. Ct. Mar. 6, 2020). 
 390. Id. at 2. 
 391. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 392. See Brief for Minnesota, Texas, 37 Other States, and the District of Columbia as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 19-368 (S. 
Ct. Apr. 2020). 
 393. Waxman, supra note 7, at 17. 
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has often justified its interest in a case by referencing an executive 
agency’s role in administering or enforcing a federal statute or the 
impact a case may have on the DOJ’s ability to engage in civil  
litigation or criminal prosecution.394 Sometimes its justification is much 
more questionable.395  
Most scholars who have evaluated whether the OSG represents 
the federal interest have asked whether the interest touches on some 
function of the federal government.396 This framework, however, could 
justify the OSG’s participation in almost any case, effectively leaving 
the decision whether to enter a case as an amicus to historical 
happenstance and the SG’s discretion. When asked why, for example, 
the OSG has participated in constitutional claims over racial 
gerrymandering but not partisan gerrymandering, a senior OSG 
attorney told us it was “somewhat by accident.”397 The AG was a named 
party in the case that established the constitutional racial 
gerrymandering claim,398 so the OSG filed an amicus brief. Ever since, 
it has participated in these cases as amicus, “even though,” as the OSG 
attorney noted, “they are Fourteenth Amendment cases on districting, 
in which the federal government now does not really have a role.”399 
More complex theories of the federal interest, as Michael 
Solimine has argued, might look to whether a case “may have a 
perceptible effect on the enforcement of federal law by some part of the 
executive branch, or where there has been a tradition of expertise 
centered in the executive branch (e.g., foreign affairs).” 400 But even this 
definition looks only to whether an interest exists rather than whether 
the SG advances those interests. In cases where the OSG advances a 
theory that undermines, for example, an agency’s enforcement policy,401 
the OSG cannot be said to be advancing a concrete interest. 
We do not suggest that the OSG violates its statutory mandate 
when it lacks a concrete interest. Rather, we propose that in these cases, 
 
 394. See supra Section II.A (finding that the most common interests asserted in OSG amicus 
briefs concerned existing federal functions). 
 395. See supra Section II.A (listing examples). 
 396. See, e.g., Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1371. 
 397. Interview with Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85 (“We entered our first racial 
gerrymandering case somewhat by accident. . . . If we had to make an original decision today about 
whether to enter those cases as an amicus, maybe we would not.”). 
 398. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 399. Interview with Senior OSG Attorney, supra note 85. 
 400. Solimine, supra note 70, at 1206.  
 401. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance in No. 17-1618 
and Reversal in No. 17-1623 at 9, Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618, 
17-1623) (adopting a position contrary to the EEOC’s enforcement policy). 
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the OSG—like any other litigant—should not be granted amicus oral 
argument time. Below, we highlight three categories of cases where the 
OSG’s docket would be most affected: cases without a concrete federal 
interest, cases against the federal interest, and cases without  
new reasoning. 
1. Cases Without a Concrete Federal Interest 
Every Term, the OSG participates as amicus in several 
politically salient cases. In many of them, the OSG claims to defend the 
“federal interest” but cannot point to any preexisting federal practice or 
regulation that would be disrupted by the upcoming ruling. The OSG 
should not be granted amicus oral argument time in these cases unless 
they fall under Standard 2. 
For example, the 2018 case Janus v. American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“AFSCME”) 
concerned the legality of agency fees.402 These fees are payments made 
by nonunion members to public sector unions. Mark Janus brought a 
First Amendment claim against AFSCME and the State of Illinois, 
arguing the mandatory fees constituted compelled political speech. The 
United States was not a party, but SG Francisco filed an amicus brief 
supporting Janus. The principal federal interest stated was as the 
“nation’s largest public employer.”403 The federal government, however, 
has no practice of imposing agency fees, and a 1978 statute prevents it 
from doing so.404 In filing the brief, the OSG was defending a principle—
not a federal practice. 
Two years earlier, then-SG Verrilli had argued as amicus in 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, which presented the 
same question as in Janus.405 He was similarly unable to articulate a 
concrete federal interest, principally referencing federal statutes that 
regulate agency fees in the private sector. Unlike Francisco, Verrilli’s 
brief supported the union. 
 
 402. 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018). 
 403. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Janus, 138 S. 
Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466). Other federal interests that the United States discussed were equally 
unpersuasive. It cited federal statutes addressing the legality of agency fees in the private sector 
(which implicates a separate theory of state action under the First Amendment) and past amicus 
participation in similar cases. Id.  
 404. 5 U.S.C. § 7102. 
 405. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Friedrichs v. 
Cal. Tchrs. Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915). 
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When SG Francisco argued in Janus, Justice Sotomayor asked 
him about the change in the OSG’s position.406 And for good reason. In 
the two years between Friedrichs and Janus, no new facts or law had 
developed. The only thing that changed was the party of the president 
and, by extension, the SG. This pair of cases illustrates how the lack of 
a concrete interest can enable the SG to take on political or ideological 
positions. By allowing the SG to participate in oral argument, the Court 
lets the OSG—cloaked in a credibility based on its proclaimed 
commitment to “justice”—benefit one side or the other at the SG’s 
discretion. Giving the OSG a megaphone through which to voice its 
purely political position undermines the Court’s legitimacy. Because 
the SG lacked a concrete interest in the public sector unions litigation, 
his motions for amicus oral argument in Janus and Friedrichs should 
have been denied. 
A similar juxtaposition appeared in the 2019 Term. In 2016, 
then-SG Verrilli entered Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt as an 
amicus on the side of the abortion provider.407 That case concerned 
regulations on abortion providers very similar to those at issue in June 
Medical Services v. Gee, a case SG Francisco entered as an amicus on 
the opposite side.408 The OSG’s brief not only cited the office’s 
participation in Whole Woman’s Health as justifying its participation in 
June Medical Services, but it also argued that the precedent be 
“narrowed or overruled.”409 
In many cases, however, the OSG’s position at amicus oral 
argument has advanced a concrete federal interest. Examples include 
cases concerning federal preemption,410 Bivens actions,411 and the 
constitutionality of federal statutes.412 In those types of cases, its 
participation in amicus oral argument is justified if it provides new 
legal reasoning. 
 
 406. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466) 
(“Justice Sotomayor: Mr.—Mr. General, by the way, how many times this term already have you 
flipped positions from prior administrations?”). 
 407. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274). 
 408. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur for Lack of Third-Party 
Standing or Affirmance on the Merits, June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (Nos. 18-
1323, 18-1460). 
 409. Id. at 5. 
 410. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Va. 
Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) (No. 16-1275). 
 411. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1–2, Hui 
v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799 (2010) (No. 08-1529). 
 412. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Bank 
Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (No. 14-770). 
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2. Cases Against the Federal Interest 
In some rare cases, the OSG’s position not only fails to defend an 
existing practice but actually undermines it. In such cases, the OSG 
does not advance a concrete interest, and therefore its motion for 
amicus oral argument should be denied unless it satisfies Standard 2.  
A case that illustrates this issue is Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. 
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which presented a constitutional 
challenge to Colorado’s public accommodations law.413 In its amicus 
brief, the OSG noted that Colorado’s public accommodations law has 
multiple analogues in federal statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.414 But the OSG’s position was that the Colorado law was 
unconstitutional. Had the Court struck down the law, large parts of the 
federal antidiscrimination structure would have come under attack.415 
The other interest that the OSG offered—the “substantial interest in 
the preservation of constitutional rights of free expression”416—would 
not meet Standard 1. A general desire to protect constitutional rights is 
not a concrete interest. Because the SG did not advance an entirely new 
argument in Masterpiece, his motion for amicus oral argument would 
have been denied under our rule. 
3. Cases Without New Reasoning 
When the SG considers whether to enter a case as amicus, the 
decision turns on the subject of the case—in other words, whether the 
case implicates the federal government or a topic on which the SG either 
wants to or believes the office should opine.417 He does not consider, 
however, whether the office will present arguments not previously 
raised by the parties when it decides whether to file an amicus brief. 
Because the OSG has a policy of requesting oral argument in every case 
 
 413. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 414. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). 
 415. Mark Walsh, Speech, Religion and Bias All Weighed in Masterpiece Cakeshop Case, 
A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/speech_religion_bias_ 
masterpiece_cakeshop/P1 [https://perma.cc/SP8R-AB43]; Jeffrey Toobin, Justices Ginsburg and 
Kagan Ask About the Artistry of Wedding Cakes, NEW YORKER (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/justices-ginsburg-and-kagan-ask-about-the-
artistry-of-wedding-cakes [https://perma.cc/FRV7-BXGH]. 
 416. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). 
 417. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 3, at 1332–33, n.46. 
             
748 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3:681 
 
in which it files a brief,418 it regularly participates in oral argument as 
an amicus although it does not make any novel legal arguments. 
This phenomenon is most prevalent in cases where the OSG’s 
interest is not distinct from that of the party it supports. In our 
conversations with Supreme Court advocates, one in particular came 
up repeatedly: criminal prosecutions. Not only does the OSG frequently 
enter criminal cases arising out of state convictions as an amicus in 
support of the state,419 but the OSG also has an informal policy against 
opposing a state in a criminal case.420 In these cases, the OSG’s interest 
is grounded in the federal government’s role as prosecutor and is 
unlikely to be different from that of the state. 
The similarity between the OSG’s amicus brief and Montana’s 
merits brief in Betterman v. Montana is illustrative.421 Betterman 
concerned whether the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause applies 
to the sentencing phase of a criminal case. The OSG’s interest in the 
case was that “[t]he Court’s resolution of that issue will apply to similar 
claims in federal prosecutions.”422 The SG made all the same legal 
arguments as Montana and justified them on the same bases.423 The 
Court nonetheless permitted the SG to participate as amicus.424  
In cases where the OSG presents neither a distinct interest nor 
novel reasoning relative to the parties, the Court is unjustified in 
hearing from OSG attorneys at oral argument. The OSG’s participation 
undermines the parties’ adversarial interests, and there is no reason to 
believe OSG attorneys would offer any incremental help to the Court. 
C. Application to Other Parties 
Because of the OSG’s virtual monopoly on amicus oral 
argument, the Court rarely hears from other amici. Between the 2010 
 
 418. See supra note 174 (statement of former SG Drew Days III). 
 419. Andrew Manuel Crespo, Regaining Perspective: Constitutional Criminal Adjudication in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1985, 1989 (2016). 
 420. See Interview with Waxman, supra note 81 (“The office generally does not enter a 
criminal case as an amicus on the side opposite a state. If they do not want to support the state in 
a criminal case, they will just stay out of it.”); Interview with Shanmugam, supra note 281 (“In 
criminal cases, the Solicitor General is only ever going to enter the case on one side. If you 
represent the criminal defendant, you usually do not even need to call.”); Interview with Senior 
OSG Attorney, supra note 85 (“In criminal cases, we know that if we are going to enter the case as 
an amicus we will do so on a particular side.”). 
 421. 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016). 
 422. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, Betterman, 
136 S. Ct. 1609 (No. 14-1457). 
 423. Compare id., with Brief for Respondent, Betterman, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (No. 14-1457). 
 424. See Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1400 (2016) (mem.). 
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and 2019 Terms, the Court granted only fifteen amicus oral argument 
motions made by parties other than the OSG. Five of these were made 
by members of the federal legislature,425 one by a state legislature,426 
five by states,427 one by a foreign sovereign entity,428 and three by a  
law professor.429 
Our framework would likely increase amicus oral argument 
participation by a variety of these litigants. Below, we highlight three 
types of cases in which the Court would likely hear more frequently 
from amici other than the OSG—criminal cases, cases involving state 
interests, and cases vindicating the federal interest—and how this 
would improve the Court’s decisionmaking process. 
1. Criminal Cases 
Under our proposal, the Court should more frequently grant 
amicus oral argument to amici who support the defendant in criminal 
cases.430 There are two reasons why these amici may be helpful at oral 
argument. First, criminal defendants are more likely than other 
categories of parties to be represented before the Court by the same 
lawyer who represented them in the trial or lower appellate courts.431 
Although many of these lawyers have limited appellate experience and 
perhaps no experience before the Court, they may refuse offers by 
 
 425. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 991 (2020) (mem.) (United 
States House of Representatives); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 1543 (2019) (mem.) 
(United States House of Representatives); United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 1539 (2016) (mem.) 
(Unites States House of Representatives); NLRB v. Canning, 571 U.S. 1092 (2013) (mem.) (Senator 
Mitch McConnell et al.); McCutcheon v. FEC, 570 U.S. 944 (2013) (mem.) (Senator  
Mitch McConnell). 
 426. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 52 (2017) (mem.) (Wisconsin State Senate and Wisconsin 
State Assembly). 
 427. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Blair, 139 S. Ct. 783 (2019) (mem.) (Illinois 
et al.); Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 582 (2018) (mem.) (Texas et al.); Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 
S. Ct. 357 (2018) (mem.) (Alaska); Sturgeon v. Masica, 577 U.S. 1047 (2015) (mem.) (Alaska); 
Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 547 U.S. 1059 (2014) (mem.) (Kansas et al.). 
 428. See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1543 (2018) (mem.) 
(Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China). 
 429. See Cox v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 576 (2018) (mem.) (Professor Aditya Bamzai); 
Dalmazzi v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 576 (2018) (mem.) (same); Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
576 (2018) (mem.) (same). 
 430. Others have argued that there should be a federal agency dedicated to advancing the 
interests of criminal defendants. See generally Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Defender 
General, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1473 (2020) (arguing that a defender general can “move doctrine 
in defendant-friendly directions” to counteract the government’s advantages). Because the effect 
of the OSG’s outsized influence at the Court on criminal defendants is only one aspect of our 
critique, we advocate for “leveling down” rather than “leveling up.” See id. at 1474, 1536-38. 
 431. Lazarus, supra note 69, at 1561; Interview with Clement, supra note 247. 
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expert Supreme Court litigators to take over as lead counsel.432 While 
some of these lawyers do a terrific job at oral argument, others are less 
successful.433 Regardless of the importance of skilled advocacy before 
the Court, it is inappropriate and unconstitutional to force the 
appointment of new counsel.434 Allowing an amicus who has a concrete 
interest in the litigation—such as the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers—to argue in support of this defendant may result in 
a fairer and more informed process.  
A second reason why the Court should hear from amici in these 
cases is the same argument we frequently heard for why the Court 
might want to hear from the OSG in these cases. According to Supreme 
Court litigators, the OSG is concerned in criminal cases with the 
formulation of a sound rule rather than with—as the state usually is—
the preservation of the criminal conviction at issue.435 An amicus 
supporting a criminal defendant can serve the same function. A lawyer 
who represents a criminal defendant is ethically obligated to advance 
that client’s interests, regardless of the impact the Court’s decision may 
have on all her other clients or on the development of the law 
generally.436 Because of the stakes, the differences in the law and 
practice across jurisdictions, and the fact-specific nature of criminal 
prosecutions, the risk that one criminal defendant’s interest in the 
formation of law diverges from that of another is high. This may lead 
the lawyer to advocate for a rule that is undesirable when applied more 
broadly. An amicus may help the Court formulate a rule that is both 
legally sound and practically viable. 
 
 432. See Crespo, supra note 419, at 2008 (finding that, from 2005 through 2015, 67% of 
criminal defendants were represented by lawyers making their first Supreme Court appearance, 
compared with 48% of civil litigants); Lazarus, supra note 69, at 1561: 
Many criminal defense attorneys, including counsel appointed at trial who may not 
themselves have significant criminal law expertise, not only insist on maintaining their 
status as lead counsel once it has become a Supreme Court case, but decline the offers 
of experts in Supreme Court advocacy for significant assistance in the preparation of 
briefs and the presentation of oral argument. 
 433. See William C. Kinder, Note, Putting Justice Kagan’s “Hobbyhorse” Through Its Paces: 
An Examination of the Criminal Defense Advocacy Gap at the U.S. Supreme Court, 103 GEO. L.J. 
227, 228 nn.1–2 (2014). 
 434. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147-48 (2006) (holding that there is 
a Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel of one’s choice). 
 435. Interview with Harrington, supra note 250. 
 436. Lawrence J. Fox & Susan R. Martyn, Monroe Freedman’s Contributions to Lawyers: 
Engagement, Energy, and Ethics, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 645 (2016). 
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2. Cases Involving State Interests 
The Court should also hear more frequently from state amici in 
cases in which a state is not a party but has a quasi-party interest.437 
Recently, litigator Dan Schweitzer catalogued every case between 1996 
and 2016 in which a state requested amicus oral argument.438 He 
concluded that, in the 2014 through 2016 Terms, the Court granted 
these requests when the “states—based on their status as sovereigns—
genuinely had a distinct perspective from the parties they were 
supporting.”439 Schweizer characterizes these as “precisely when states 
ought to be permitted to argue as amici.”440 These cases generally 
concerned the distribution of power between federal and state 
governments, double jeopardy, and state powers under the 
Constitution.441 There were no requests during this period from states 
in cases where both federal and state governments enforce a federal law 
but may disagree on its interpretation, but Schweizer argues these are 
instances in which states should be permitted to argue as well.442 
These amici would be permitted to argue under Standard 1 as 
long as they contribute reasoning not already presented by the parties. 
These quasi-party interests are exactly the type that the American 
amicus role has historically been used to accommodate,443 as well as the 
interests the Court presumably honors by hearing from the OSG in 
many instances. A state litigant that can offer a perspective that is truly 
distinct from that of the party it supports will likely present new 
reasoning that highlights that perspective.444 
The Wisconsin State Senate and Wisconsin State Assembly’s 
amicus oral argument in support of Petitioners in Gill v. Whitford is 
illustrative.445 Gill concerned the constitutionality of partisan 
gerrymandering, and Petitioners were members of the Wisconsin 
Elections Commission.446 Petitioners’ arguments reflected their 
positions as election administrators by focusing on the court’s power 
 
 437. For an argument that hearing state perspectives would also address concerns about the 
Court’s politicization, see Johnstone, supra note 272, at 598–622. 
 438. See Schweitzer, supra note 240, at 147–50. 
 439. Id. at 153. 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. at 153–54. 
 442. Id. at 154–55. 
 443. See supra Section I.A. 
 444. Research suggests that state amicus participation is “most prominent, and most effective, 
in federalism cases.” Johnstone, supra note 272, at 603. When state positions conflict or states 
uniformly oppose a federalist position, however, the Court favors nationalization. Id. at 603. 
 445. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
 446. Id. at 1920. 
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over redistricting and the merits of the redistricting plan. For example, 
their brief opened by claiming the district court did not have jurisdiction 
over Respondents’ claims.447 It went on to explain that Respondents had 
not “stated a claim on which relief can be granted” based on the Court’s 
precedent,448 and that the redistricting plan at issue was permissible.449 
In stark contrast, the Wisconsin legislature’s arguments 
mirrored its institutional interest in the case: asserting state 
legislatures’ power over the redistricting process in the face of potential 
involvement by the federal judiciary. Its brief first argued that partisan 
gerrymandering lawsuits effectively reassigned the redistricting task 
from state legislatures to federal courts.450 The brief went on to explain 
that all challenges to statewide gerrymandering rely on a flawed 
conception of the U.S. electoral system as one that guarantees 
proportional representation and classifies candidates based on party 
affiliation.451 Not all the arguments raised in the brief were novel 
relative to Petitioners’ brief, but they were aimed at the entire class of 
gerrymandering claims, rather than only the one at issue—which the 
legislature addressed in the last five pages of its brief.452 The Court’s 
questioning of Erin Murphy, the legislature’s advocate, focused 
primarily on the novel portion of the brief.453 
3. Cases Vindicating the Federal Interest 
In some cases, the OSG represents a party to litigation but has 
no intention of fully defending the federal interest, and an amicus would 
like to do so instead. These include cases where, for example, the SG 
presents a weaker reading of a federal statute than is legally defensible.  
Hearing from an amicus who would offer a full-throated defense 
of the federal interest would likely lead to better case outcomes. An SG’s 
decision to defend a federal statute, regulation, or policy only on limited 
grounds is most likely to arise from political considerations rather than 
objective legal analysis. These cases may arise when, for example, the 
timing of a presidential election means that the SG who petitioned for 
certiorari is different from the one briefing and arguing the merits. 
Currently, the Court appoints an amicus to defend the government 
 
 447. Brief for Appellants at 26–41, Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161). 
 448. Id. at 23, 41–59. 
 449. Id. at 59–67. 
 450. Brief for Amici Curiae Wisconsin State Senate and Wisconsin State Assembly in Support 
of Appellants at 4-16, Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161). 
 451. Id. at 17–31. 
 452. Id. at 31–37. 
 453. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18–29, Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161). 
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when the OSG entirely declines to defend its client.454 The decision to 
do so, rather than to dismiss the case for lack of a “Case or 
Controversy,”455 suggests that the Court harbors some skepticism about 
these refusals to defend the federal interest. Our proposed standard 
does not invade the government’s authority to take whatever position it 
desires; it simply allows an amicus to supplement it. 
Additionally, appointing an amicus in these cases would allow 
the Court to respond to a problem it had a part in creating. The Court 
has been one of the strongest forces pushing the federal government to 
speak in “one voice,” even when it allows the OSG to take these 
compromise positions.456 Over the years, one of the ways in which the 
Court has reaffirmed that it wants the OSG to speak for the federal 
government is by denying motions for amicus oral argument made on 
behalf of one agency when the OSG already represents a party.457 This 
position allows the OSG to take middle positions without fear of the 
agency representing a contrary view. Allowing amici to argue in these 
cases would permit the vindication of those interests and might 
discourage the OSG from taking these positions. 
Kisor v. Wilkie illustrates the value that an amicus could add.458 
Kisor asked whether the Court should overrule precedent holding that 
courts must defer to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations 
under certain circumstances.459 The long-term interest of the federal 
government was clear: the executive’s power is maximized if its 
agencies receive more deference from courts. Rather than defend the 
Court’s precedent, however, SG Francisco argued that it was 
inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act and had “harmful 
practical consequences.”460 He urged that “the Court should impose and 
reinforce significant limits” on the deference regime.461 The SG’s 
“halfhearted” defense did not escape the Justices’ notice.462 At oral 
argument, Petitioner’s attorney answered a question from Justice 
 
 454. Shaw, supra note 331, at 1548–49. 
 455. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 456. See supra notes 318-321 and accompanying text. 
 457. See, e.g., United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 505 U.S. 1243 (1992) (mem.) (denying the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation’s motion for leave to participate in oral arguments as 
amicus curiae); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 820 (1972) (mem.) (denying the 
Federal Power Commission’s motion for leave to participate in oral arguments as amicus curiae). 
 458. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 459. Id. at 2408. 
 460. Brief for the Respondent at 26–27, Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (No. 18-15). 
 461. Id. at 12. 
 462. Adam Liptak, Limiting Agency Power, a Goal of the Right, Gets Supreme Court Test, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/us/politics/supreme-court-agency-
power.html [https://perma.cc/ZC57-GVJ4]. 
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Kagan by first explaining that its position was no different than the 
government’s (the Respondent) on that point. She responded, “There 
might be a problem of a lack of adversarialness here.”463 
In Kisor, there was a clear candidate for an amicus who could 
offer a defense of the Court’s precedent: former SG Verrilli. Verrilli was 
counsel of record on an amicus brief filed by administrative law scholars 
that offered a thorough rebuttal to Petitioner’s argument.464 When the 
opinions in Kisor were issued, Verrilli’s brief was cited twice by the 
majority and twice by the concurrence, which described the brief as an 
example of the deference regime’s “fiercest defenders.”465  
Verrilli did not request amicus oral argument. When we asked 
Verrilli why not, he remarked, “Had the Justices felt like there was not 
a sufficient adversarial presentation, they could have asked for oral 
argument from amici or appointed someone to argue.”466 Of course, the 
Court could have asked. But if it developed a practice of hearing from 
amici in cases like Kisor, litigators like Verrilli might be more inclined 
to request to be heard. 
CONCLUSION 
The OSG is the most influential litigant that appears before the 
Court. It is more successful at the petition and merits stages than 
others, and it is more successful when it is an amicus supporting a party 
than when it represents a party. This Article’s account of the OSG’s 
dominance of amicus oral argument before the Court draws attention 
to a largely unexamined aspect of that influence. From our interviews 
with Supreme Court litigators, the industry recognizes and accepts this 
phenomenon. These lawyers take the OSG’s special place at the Court 
into account, trying to convince the OSG to support their client as 
amicus when possible and otherwise trying to convince the OSG to stay 
out of the case. 
We suspect that the Court has not thought much about why it 
grants virtually all the OSG’s motions for amicus oral argument and 
denies almost all others. In fact, we imagine that the Justices—
members of a government institution themselves, all of whom spent 
portions of their careers at other government institutions, including the 
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OSG467—have not seriously considered the special place they reserve for 
the OSG. In 2014, Joan Biskupic and others interviewed eight of the 
nine sitting Justices as part of their reporting on the outsized success 
of former OSG members in seeking certiorari at the Court.468 Each 
Justice interviewed believed that having these lawyers handle most of 
the cases before the Court was helpful and came “without any 
significant cost”469—despite the fact that almost all their work at law 
firms catered to moneyed interests.  
Reforming the Court’s amicus oral argument practice alone 
would not remedy the OSG’s outsized influence. We hope that this 
Article will inspire a broader re-examination of the OSG’s role at the 
Court, and we look forward to continuing to participate in this 
conversation.470 Like those who have called attention to the Court’s 
unexamined practices in other areas, we believe that the Court creates 
significant procedural and substantive problems by acquiescing to the 
OSG’s extensive use of amicus oral argument. We respectfully 
recommend that it reconsider this highly consequential practice. 
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